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Abstract 
This qualitative study examined the startup phase of a new manufacturing facility in the 
rigid plastics packaging industry. Thirteen personnel were interviewed for their 
impressions of the startup experience, and were asked for their recommendations for the 
type of leadership, training and knowledge sharing, and organizational systems and 
support needed for a new plant startup to succeed. Participants noted both successes and 
challenges related to the plant manager, training and support delivered, and 
communication and other organizational systems in place. Participants offered several 
recommendations, including improving leader selection and preparation; optimizing 
training resources, schedules, and materials for each area; improving coordination, 
communication, and training for visiting support staff; and adapting human resources, 
project management, and equipment. Based on these findings, several recommendations 
for executive leaders, project management, and organization development consultants 
were identified. The key suggestion for continued research is to repeat the study with an 
enhanced research design. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Organizational growth and performance hinge upon the effective deployment of 
productive knowledge in new facilities. However, getting those facilities fully operational 
can be difficult and time consuming. Interestingly, we understand little about what 
determines the performance of that process (Salomon & Martin, 2008, p. 1266). 
To develop and sustain competitive advantage, a firm must do more than simply 
create distinctive knowledge-based assets; it must also exploit the resulting advantage 
efficiently (Nelson & Winter, 1982). To leverage its advantage, a multiplant firm must 
effectively extend that advantage to new facilities across various locations. However, 
making technologies viable in new facilities is often a difficult and time-consuming 
process (e.g., Hatch & Mowery, 1998; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Martin & Salomon, 
2003a). Moreover, the success of that process stands to substantially affect firm 
performance. 
Salomon and Martin (2008) recognized that firms vary substantially in how 
quickly they are able to build new plants. These differences—specifically, being able to 
build out a new plant quickly—forms the basis for lasting competitive advantage (Martin 
& Salomon, 2003a; Winter & Szulanski, 2001). Consequently, Salomon and Martin 
(2008) examined the strategic determinants affecting the time to build. 
The present study examined one new plant startup to determine what occurred and 
what recommendations emerged for leadership, training and knowledge sharing, and 
organization systems and support, as reported by employees. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to identify what personnel need in order to rapidly 
achieve steady and sustainable performance during the startup phase of a new 
manufacturing facility in the rigid plastics packaging industry. Four research questions 
were examined: 
1. What were employees’ impressions of the startup experience? 
2. What recommendations do employees provide regarding the type of 
leadership needed for a new plant startup? 
3. What recommendations do employees provide regarding training and 
knowledge sharing needed for a new plant startup? 
4. What recommendations do employees provide regarding the organizational 
systems and support needed for a new plant startup? 
Study Setting 
The study was performed in a multinational rigid plastics packaging company 
headquartered in Europe with more than 159 production sites worldwide across more 
than 40 countries. The case site was in the US. The company operates with a hierarchical 
structure and employs approaching 16,000 individuals globally, with about 1,100 in the 
US. 
The company produces various plastic packaging products for consumer goods in 
personal care, homecare, food, beverages, and oils and lubricants. The company has 
grown steadily over its history, opening on average five new plants per year. The 
company specializes in rapid startups and has created a standardized process to guide 
each startup. The process is overseen by various global groups with responsibilities over 
physical construction, program and project management, recruiting and training. The 
company has created templates to guide each phase of the startup to promote success. 
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Despite its standardized process, a recent startup process, referred to in this study 
as the ABC Plant, faced substantial challenges related to hiring, turnover, and 
technological complexity. These challenges affected the cost, productivity, and quality of 
the product line. It was important for the study organization to understand what occurred 
at the ABC plant startup in order to learn from the experience and determine how, if at 
all, the standardized process needs to be adapted to more rapidly achieve productivity and 
profitability in future plant startups. 
Study Significance 
Effectively navigating the process of a new plant startup is central to achieving 
organizational growth and performance within the manufacturing sector (Salomon & 
Martin, 2008). However, doing so is no small feat. Moreover, as in the case of the study 
organization, even when a company has in place well-developed and standardized 
procedures to guide and govern the startup process, challenges can arise to undermine the 
overall effort. 
This study examined one case of a startup and produced important findings useful 
for the study organization and potentially similar organizations struggling to navigate the 
new plant startup process. Specifically, the study generated findings about the aspects 
that did and did not go well, leading to insights about what aspects of the startup process 
may need attention and modification. Specific attention was given to the type of 
leadership, training and knowledge sharing mechanisms, and organizational systems and 
supports that are believed to promote startup success, from the perspective of a range of 
personnel who were deeply involved in the process. These insights may be useful for 
revisiting and revising new plant startup processes so that future startups may not 
experience the same delays, costs, and difficulties. 
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Organization of the Study 
The present chapter provided the background for the study, including its purpose 
and study setting. The study significance and my background as the researcher also were 
discussed. Chapter 2 reviews literature relevant to the present study, including a 
discussion of the rigid plastics industry and new plant startups. 
Chapter 3 describes the methods used to conduct the present study, including the 
research design, procedures for recruiting participants, assuring confidentiality and 
consent, and collecting and analyzing data. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the study. Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the 
findings, including conclusions, recommendations, limitations, and directions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
The purpose of this study was to identify what personnel need in order to rapidly 
achieve steady and sustainable performance during the startup phase of a new 
manufacturing facility in the rigid plastics packaging industry. This chapter provides a 
review of literature relevant to the study. Information about the rigid plastics industry is 
presented first to provide context for the study. Next, new plant startups are discussed, 
including definitions, a discussion of the startup process, influences on startup outcomes, 
and personnel needs during new plant startups. 
Rigid Plastics Industry 
The Global Packaging Industry is a growing industry. Rigid plastics packaging 
materials have certain inherent properties that make them ideal for consumer packaging 
materials. They are tough, durable, lightweight, easily moldable, and convenient to 
transport and not as brittle as glass. All those characteristics make it a perfect choice for 
the packaging of bulk and unit material. The rigid plastics packaging industry can be 
divided in four segments: rigid plastic bottles, rigid plastic bulk containers, rigid plastic 
caps and closures, and rigid plastic blisters. Cost per unit of production is low, and these 
packaging materials have a wide scope of applications in various industries. Packaging 
has become an everyday item and its usage is tightly linked to overall economic growth. 
The global packaging market consists of five main types of packaging: paper and 
bags (including paper bags and cartons), which holds the biggest market share (34%); 
rigid plastics (27% market share); flexible plastics (11% market share); glass (11% 
market share); and beverage cans (10% market share). 
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By end-use, the rigid plastics packaging market can be divided into six categories: 
food, beverage, healthcare, personal care, industrial, and other end-use sectors. By resin 
type, the rigid plastics packaging market is divided into five categories: 
1. Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET): a clear, tough resin with good gas and 
moisture barrier properties (e.g., for oxygen, water, and carbon dioxide). This 
resin is commonly used in beverage bottles and many injection-molded 
consumer product containers. PET has clear and optically smooth surfaces for 
oriented firms and bottles. The material has high impact capability and is 
shatter resistant. It also has excellent resistance to most solvents, and is 
capable for hot-filling. The resin is most commonly used to produce plastic 
bottles and jars for food and beverages. 
2. High Density Polyethylene (HDPE): offers excellent resistance to most 
solvents and has higher tensile strength compared to other forms of 
polyethylene. It is a relatively still material with useful temperature 
capabilities. HDPE is used to make bottles such as unpigmented bottles, often 
used to package products with short shelf lives (e.g., milk). The superior 
chemical resistance of HDPE has made it a popular choice for packaging 
many household and industrial chemicals such as detergents and bleach. 
3. Low Density Polyethylene (LDPE): a tough, flexible, and relative transparent 
resin, predominately used for film applications where heat sealing is 
necessary. Although mostly used as a flexible plastic, LDPE can be used for 
the manufacturing of plastic trays and squeezable bottles. LDPE has excellent 
resistance to acids, bases, and vegetable oils. 
4. Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC): a resin offering high impact strength, brilliant 
clarity, and excellent processing performance. It is resistant to grease, oil, and 
chemicals. In addition to its stable physical and electrical properties, the 
material has good chemical resistance, weatherability, and flow 
characteristics. In rigid packaging applications, PVC can be used to make 
blister packs and clamshells. 
5. Polypropylene (PP): a strong resin that has good chemical resistance and a 
high melting point, which makes it good for hot-fill liquids. It has excellent 
optical clarity, and low moisture vapor transmission. This resin also is inert 
towards acids, alkalis, and most solvents. It is used in both rigid and flexible 
plastic packaging. For rigid packaging, PP often is used to make containers for 
yogurt margarine, takeout meals, and deli foods. It can also be used to make 
medicine bottles and bottle caps and closures. 
History of the industry. Plastic originally meant something that is pliable and 
easily shaped. Only recently has it become the name for a category of materials called 
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polymers. Polymer means “of many parts,” and polymers are made of long chains of 
molecules. Polymers abound in nature. Cellulose, the material that makes up the cell 
walls of plants, is a very common natural polymer. 
In 1860, the development of plastics was supposed to have started by Phelan and 
Collander, a US based pool and billiard ball company. They allegedly offered a prize of 
$10,000 to the person who could design the best substitute for natural ivory. One of the 
contestants developed a cellulose derivate which was later patented under the name 
Celluloid which has been quite successful on the market. During the next decades plastic 
has gained more and more of importance. After the turn of the century, Leo Hendrik 
Baekeland, who was a Belgium-American chemist, developed the first completely 
synthetic plastic. 
In 1920, a German chemist called Hermann Staudinger had a breakthrough in 
terms of development of plastic material. His success story triggered more and more 
research. New plastic products were developed during the 1920s and 1930s. This includes 
Nylon, Plexiglas, and Teflon in 1950. After World War II plastics were being used in 
place of metal in such things as machinery and safety helmets, and in other devices. A 
German chemist called Karl Ziegler developed polyethylene in 1953 and an Italian 
chemist called Giulio Natta developed polypropylene. Those two type of plastics are still 
the most common used ones today. In 1963 those two scientists received the Nobel Prize 
in Chemistry for their research in polymers. The efforts to develop new plastics is still 
ongoing currently and new and exciting ways to use plastics are constantly being 
developed. 
Current size of the industry. By 2014, the global consumer packaging market 
has a value of about US$ 820 billion including the industrial end-markets. The value of 
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the world market for Rigid Plastics Packaging is estimated at US$ 142 billion as of 2014 
and has the potential to reach US$ 190 billion by 2020. The growth forecast for the 
period 2013 to 2018 is 5.2%, making this type of packaging the fastest growing in the 
plastics industry (Smithers PIRA, 2013). Growth has been driven by strong demand from 
the food and beverage packaging industries, as a big share of food sold through grocery 
stores is packaged, and as beverage producers opt for plastic ahead of glass and metal for 
reasons of cost efficiency. The US is the largest market for rigid plastics packaging, 
whereas Eastern Europe is the fastest growing market in that type of packaging due to a 
significant shift towards plastic packaging in fast growing beverage markets – mostly soft 
drinks, but also beer. 
The key players in the Rigid Plastics Industry are the following companies: 
Amcor, ALPLA, Berry Plastics, Graham Packaging, Logoplast, Plastipak, Silgan, etc. 
Five out of those seven players are US based and two are European based. 
Industry trends. Although the growth of the Global Packaging Industry is 
different across regions, depending on the level of development of the region, there are 
some factors which influence the overall growth of this industry on a rather long-term 
basis. Those factors include the ageing of the world population; the trend towards smaller 
households; the increasing requirement for convenience among consumers; rising health 
awareness among consumers; the trend towards the ‘on-the-go’ lifestyles among 
increasingly time-poor consumers; growing requirements for brand 
enhancement/differentiation in an increasingly competitive environment; new packaging 
material development; the move towards smaller pack sizes as the incidence of families 
eating together at the dinner table become less common; increasing awareness of 
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environmental issues, and the adoption of new regulatory requirements on packaging 
recycling. 
Looking at all those factors, the one which was ranked the highest in regards to 
being important and influential on the industry growth is the ‘Health awareness’. The 
lowest ranked one was the ‘Ageing of the world population’. 
On the other hand the Packaging Industry is facing some serious challenges. As 
the macroeconomic environment has been challenging is some countries, the pressure on 
consumer spending went up. The economy in Europe has been somehow uncertain and 
the raw material and energy prize inflation has had a negative impact on the packaging 
producers overall. 
With the growing concern of environmental issues and the introduction of new 
environmental legislations, the Packaging Industry and especially the Plastic Packaging 
Industry is facing a huge challenge on how to respond to consumers in a way that they 
keep their faith in this type of packaging solution. The Plastic Packaging Industry is 
trying to find solutions by reducing the amount of packaging used by light weighting of 
materials and by using PCR (post-consumer resin) in the packaging (e.g., plastic bottles). 
Key metrics. TechNavio, a British based market research company, predicts that 
the Global Plastic Packaging Market will grow at a compound annual growth rate of 
6.06% from 2014-2019 with a predicted growth of 4.72% for the rigid plastics packaging 
market. This is compared to other types of packaging such as glass (3.9% compound 
annual growth rate) and corrugated boxes (3.98% compound annual growth rate). 
Success in the global packaging industry is associated with the following success 
factors: management of raw material inflation, the reduction of waste, effective capital 
expenditure, operational performance measurement, product and customer profitability 
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management, innovation and global supply chain management. Management of raw 
material inflation refers to the necessity of companies in the packaging industry to 
manage the stability of their input raw material costs and pass through as much of the raw 
material price inflation as possible to the customer. They are typically in a very 
vulnerable position as their customers are very often powerful consumer goods 
companies that put a tremendous price pressure on them as they want to be competitive 
on the market. Reduction of waste: Due to increasing environmental concerns the 
packaging companies are investing in more sophisticated machinery in order to increase 
their process stability to more effectively manage their waste as well as they are 
attempting to reduce the material content which is in the plastics industry called ‘light-
weighting’. 
In terms of effective capital expenditure, the capital intensiveness is relatively 
high in the packaging industry due to the sophisticated machinery which is required to 
meet the quality standard the customer requires. Management needs to be experienced in 
managing the balance between maintaining the existing equipment and investing in new 
technology in order to be able to be competitive. A beneficial matrix to assess 
performance in that area is the “spread” between EBITDA and capex (Capital 
expenditure)  EBITDA – capex. 
In order to achieve continuous operational excellence, it is important to measure 
the right things. Therefore it is important to have the most meaningful KPI’s (key 
performance indicators) in place. “Whatever gets measured gets delivered” (Ernst & 
Young, 2008). 
Regarding product and customer profitability measurement, management needs to 
have the possibility to rank their customers by profitability. Companies that fail to do so 
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risk ending up with a high number of low-margin products which take up the available 
capacity without making any profit. 
In terms of innovation, demographic changes such as the decline of the nuclear 
family, increase in average age, and increase of single households and increased market 
share, competition have changed and will continue to change the packaging industry. To 
respond to those changes, packaging companies have to be innovative and need to come 
up with new shapes, new materials, more colors, and deliver short-run lengths in an 
economic way. Additionally they need to be close to the end-market consumer by 
fostering and nurturing collaborative relationships with the customers, as they are closer 
to the end-consumer. 
The factor of global supply chain management refers to managing the costs 
involved to produce the packaging. As packaging overall yields a typically low-value 
product, production site location is a key driver of economic performance. Price 
decreases as distance between the packaging plant and customers fill line decreases. 
Some packaging companies are even located in the customer’s building and thus feed the 
packaging (i.e., plastic bottles) directly into the customer’s fill line. This approach is 
called an in-house solution. 
In terms of revenue, the global rigid packaging market is expected to grow 
moderately during the forecast period. The major customers of rigid packaging are 
distributed across various verticals such as F&B, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, and 
consumer goods. 
New Plant Startups 
Definitions. New plant startup refers to the process of creating a new 
manufacturing facility within an existing organization (Salomon & Martin, 2008). 
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Several variables are used to determine the success of a new plant startup. These 
variables are discussed in the following sections. 
Time-to-build. Time-to-build is defined as the time it takes to complete a 
manufacturing facility. The economics literature has identified the time-to-build 
manufacturing facilities as an important strategic consideration for firms (Pacheco-de-
Almeida & Zemsky, 2003). New manufacturing facilities represent substantial and lasting 
investments for firms. In fact, the average cost of a new, full-scale semiconductor plant 
has been estimated at upwards of $1 billion (IC Knowledge, 2001). Not surprisingly, 
commitments to new facilities with such high stakes can have a substantial impact on 
firm performance (Salomon & Martin, 2008). Several variables are believed to influence 
time-to-build, as outlined in the remainder of this section. 
Facility capacity. This is measured as its monthly wafer fabrication capacity 
(expressed in thousands), with the supposition that larger plants take longer to build. 
Salomon and Martin (2008) found in their study of semiconductor plants that facility 
capacity was positive and significantly related to time-to-build; however, the economic 
significance of this effect was small. 
Facility cost. Overall cost of the plant represents the inflation-adjusted cost to 
build the plant. As a correlate of plant size and scope, it might be expected that facility 
cost is positively related to time-to-build; however, to the extent that facility cost proxies 
for the time-cost trade-off when building a plant (Mansfield et al., 1982, Pacheco-de-
Almeida & Zemsky 2003), it might be negatively associated with time-to-build. Salomon 
and Martin (2008) found in their study of semiconductor plants that facility cost was 
positive and significantly related to time-to-build; however, the economic significance of 
this effect was small. 
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Resource costs. Resource costs refer to the value of the resources used to 
accomplish the new plant startup (Galbraith, 1990). Past studies have established that 
substantial costs are associated with any plant startup. 
Pre-transfer planning and engineering costs. These costs are typically incurred 
prior to the actual plant startup and include documentation and codification of 
technology, including engineering desires, equipment setup and use, and process layout; 
documentation of management responsibilities such as inventory control methods, quality 
assurance, and shipping requirements; training; costs to ship, assemble, and test 
equipment, tools, and instrumentation; and salaries sand other personnel expenses 
associated with pre-transfer activities (Galbraith, 1990). 
Post-startup management and control costs. These costs reflect those resources 
typically applied after the actual technology startup and include relocating a temporary 
engineering team to the new facility; non-optimal parallel or simultaneous co-production 
elsewhere in the organization; post-startup communication efforts between the new 
startup and other parts of the organization; and designing and maintaining accurate post-
startup reporting and control systems (Galbraith, 1990). 
Productivity and know-how loss. New startups require transition through a 
startup phase wherein skills from other plants much be relearned at the new facility 
(Galbraith, 1990). Productivity and opportunity costs are incurred as the plant proceeds 
through this phase. These costs reflect those resources typically applied after the actual 
technology startup and include relocating a temporary engineering team to the new 
facility; non-optimal parallel or simultaneous co-production elsewhere in the 
organization; post-startup communication efforts between the new startup and other parts 
of the organization; and designing and maintaining accurate post-startup reporting and 
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control systems (Galbraith, 1990). Galbraith asserted based on his review of plant transfer 
and startup research that much of a firm’s productivity loss is due to misplaced 
documents and lost small equipment. He added that a transition team should provide the 
new startup with know-how typically not available in written documents, allowing for 
long-term engineering continuity and training. 
New plant startup process. Building a new plant is a long and carefully planned 
process (Salomon & Martin, 2008). The process usually begins with a forecast of demand 
conditions, startup equipment requirements, and the firm’s ability to meet demand. If the 
firm determines that it cannot adequately meet demand without constructing a new 
facility, it then determines its equipment needs, the projected budget, the capacity, and 
considers possible locations for the plant. This takes several weeks to complete. 
After the firm has determined that it should build a plant, it will generally 
announce publicly its intentions to do so (Salomon & Martin, 2008). This is when the 
pre-startup phase begins. In a detailed study of 48 new plants started by established firms, 
Doeringer, Klock, and Terkla (2002) found that parent firms often provide considerable 
technical assistance in plant design and equipment layout, work organization, and 
designing specific human resources practices related to training, worker participation, and 
performance incentives. Parent firms also supply senior managers who “are 
knowledgeable about the state-of-the art high-performance management practices and are 
well-versed in their corporation’s approaches to operations management” (Doeringer et 
al., 2002, p. 47). Such assistance is particularly important, because firms require time 
(and often multiple attempts) before generic practices can be successfully tailored to the 
needs of the new plant venture (Balasubramanian, 2011). For instance, even a very 
successful company like GE has a history of mixed results in new plant startups (Butler, 
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1991). Another illustrative example comes from Steelcase (an office furniture 
manufacturer), who tried at least four times between 1989 and 2002 to establish effective 
work teams in its North American manufacturing plants (Mann, 2002). Similarly, BF 
Goodrich’s implementation of gainsharing in one of its plants took at least two years of 
rework (Masternak, 1993). This uncertainty puts new plant ventures of entrepreneurial 
entrants at a disadvantage when they try to develop their capabilities and implement 
practices. In contrast, new plants of established firms can leverage their parent firms’ 
prior experience to enhance the speed of learning. Second, and over the longer term, new 
plant ventures benefit from their parent’s experience in strategic renewal. Established 
firms are more likely than new entrants to have faced environmental changes. Hence, 
they are more likely to have integrative knowledge (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009; Chen, 
Williams, & Agarwal, 2011; Zahra, Sapienza, & Davidsson, 2006) that allows them to 
reconfigure firm resources to fit new problems and opportunities (Baker & Nelson, 2005; 
Ganco & Agarwal, 2009; Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). For instance, Holbrook, Hounshell, 
Cohen, and Klepper (2000) describe how de novo firm Fairchild, though initially 
successful, eventually failed as “expansion eroded the close relationship between R&D 
and production” (p. 1027). On the other hand, Motorola, a diversifying entrant, overcame 
the same problem by “[breaking] up the existing organizational structure and replac[ing] 
it with product groups with responsibility for both R&D and production” (p. 1024). 
Concurrently, or soon thereafter, the firm orders all necessary equipment, begins 
to design the layout of the plant, and develops an overall project plan and schedule. The 
firm breaks ground thereafter (the specific time varies based on the complexity of the 
startup) and the physical construction begins. During the base build, the foundation gets 
laid, the plumbing is installed, and the physical structure goes up. The firm then installs 
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the production machinery and the equipment testing begins to assure that the products 
will be satisfactorily produced. Testing continues until the firm is satisfied that the 
equipment works properly and that it thoroughly understands how to use the equipment. 
Although there are still some kinks left to work out, the firm now officially opens its 
doors for production and begins its ramp-up. During the ramp-up phase the firm produces 
salable product, but production is not yet perfected. Yield (the proportion of output that is 
of sufficient quality to sell) is generally low. The ramp-up phase continues until the plant 
reaches its target yield and intended capacity, a milestone marking the completion of the 
implementation process (Hatch & Mowery, 1998). 
Although firms subcontract various portions of the activity to construction firms 
and equipment manufacturers, they generally manage and coordinate the entire project, 
and perform many of the tasks involved, including technical tasks. Moreover, there exists 
substantial heterogeneity across companies in how they manage and coordinate the 
activities, and how effectively they implement their technologies (McDonald, 1998). 
Influences on startup outcomes. Scholars from various disciplines recognize the 
potential impact of knowledge transfer, deployment, and implementation on 
organizational success and viability (e.g., Teece, 1977; Galbraith, 1990, Winter & 
Szulanski, 2001), little attention has been devoted to how such effects manifest in the 
time it takes to make new facilities viable. Balasubramanian (2011) added that prior firm 
experience, firm capabilities, and the industry environment are known to be important 
determinants of new-venture performance. 
General factors. Salomon and Martin (2008) examined the competitive, firm, and 
technology characteristics combined to affect the time it takes firms to get their facilities 
fully operational. As such, the dependent variable of interest is time-to-build, meaning 
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the time it takes a firm to build and ramp up operations at a new manufacturing facility 
(Koeva, 2000; Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2003). They concluded that the time to build 
manufacturing facilities is externally determined by a host of competitive, organizational, 
and technology characteristics. 
Technological complexity. The difficulty and complexity of the technology to be 
implemented within the new plant substantially affect the process and the time needed to 
make the plant operational (Salomon & Martin, 2008). Scholars in the industrial 
organization economic tradition have focused on the effects that the time it takes to make 
technologies viable in new facilities (i.e., time-to-build) have on production and profit at 
the industry level. Early empirical work examined time-to-build to assess performance 
differences across industries rather than firms (e.g., Ghemawat, 1984; Koeva, 2000; 
Lieberman, 1987a; Mayer, 1960; Mayer & Sonenblum, 1955). Studies conclude that 
heterogeneity exists across industries in the time it takes to build plants. In this tradition, 
research generally models such heterogeneity as an exogenous, industry-specific 
constraint that impacts some outcome of interest. For instance, Pacheco-de-Almeida and 
Zemsky (2003) examined how firms choose to invest in production capacity given a 
delay in the time it takes to get production facilities online. 
With respect to the deployment and transfer of knowledge to new facilities, 
scholars have focused on how characteristics of the technology to be employed constrain 
or encourage expansion. Work from an evolutionary, knowledge-based perspective 
highlights that the complexity and tacitness of the knowledge to be deployed in a facility 
stand to impede knowledge transfer (Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1993; Martin & Salomon 
2003a, 2003b; Simonin, 1999a, 1999b; Teece, 1977). Complex knowledge is inherently 
difficult to convey (Mansfield et al., 1982; Teece, 1977). Teece (1977), for example, 
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found that complexity increased the costs of implementing productive knowledge. In the 
same vein, Simonin (1999b) showed a negative relationship between complexity (and 
tacitness) and the ease of transferring marketing know-how. Szulanski (1996) studied 
how characteristics of the knowledge and the parties involved influence perceptions of 
transfer and implementation efficacy. He found that knowledge stickiness increased the 
difficulty of the transfer of best practices within organizations. Firms, however, can 
fruitfully develop strategies to address these challenges (Galbraith, 1990). For instance, 
Winter and Szulanski (2001) argue for replication as strategy. They maintain that firms 
may develop capabilities to routinize knowledge deployment. Intel’s “Copy Exactly!” 
approach to building semiconductor plants stands as an example of such (McDonald, 
1998): Every facet of existing productive knowledge should be replicated down to the 
finest detail when deploying technologies in new facilities. Further, Martin & Salomon 
(2003a) argue that competitive heterogeneity exists among firms in their abilities to 
transfer knowledge efficiently, with predictable governance and performance 
consequences. 
The nature of the technology being deployed in a new facility stands to have a 
substantial impact on time-to-build. Technology complexity plays a critical role 
(Galbraith, 1990; Kogut & Zander 1992, 1993; Teece, 1977). Complexity increases with 
the number, variety, sophistication, and interactions among components, especially when 
the know-how represents an advance relative to the state of the art (Scuricini, 1988). 
Firms that implement complex, state-of-the-art technologies often deal with less codified 
knowledge for which they lack requisite process understanding -  the “know why” and 
the “know how” - to produce reliably, and at high volume (Bohn, 1994). To put complex 
technologies to productive use, firms must first gain an understanding of those 
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technologies (Edmondson, Winslow, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2004). Because complex 
knowledge is difficult to understand, express, and replicate accurately (Argote, 1999; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982), the need for coordination is greater (Teece, 1977), greater ex 
ante experimentation is required (Bohn & Terwiesch, 1999; Terwiesch & Bohn, 2001), 
and troubleshooting is often more difficult (Hatch & Dyer, 2004). In fact, Terwiesch and 
Bohn (2001) document ramp-up problems at semiconductor plants associated with the 
launch of new products and production processes. Likewise, Galbraith (1990) found that 
complex technologies are associated with greater productivity loss after plants are 
opened, and a longer time to recover from such loss. For these reasons, we expect 
complexity to increase the time it takes to effectively implement technologies in new 
production facilities, thus increasing time-to-build. Salomon and Martin (2008) found in 
their study of semiconductor plant startups that plants, the more complex the technology, 
the longer it takes to get new plants up and running. 
Competition. Competition also affects the startup of new plants (Salomon & 
Martin, 2008). Business actions do not occur in a void. Firms are constantly vying for 
position, trying to beat competitors to market (Chen et al., 1992). Competitive dynamics 
and interfirm rivalry focus firm attention and motivate responses to other firms’ actions 
(Chen, 1996). Whenever actions taken by incumbents or entrants are perceived as 
threatening in nature (e.g., threatening a firm’s market position or its potential to earn 
above normal returns), the focal firm will generally respond vigorously (Chen et al., 
1992; Schumpeter, 1934). In the context of time-to-build, when faced with competitors 
making large resource commitments to build similar (or more advanced) facilities, the 
focal firm has incentives to beat its competitors to market in order to preserve its position. 
We therefore expect firms to strategically speed their plant investments in an attempt to 
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make their facilities viable sooner when more rival facilities with similar, or superior 
technology, are being built. 
Organizational systems and conditions. Foundry status. Foundries are 
subcontracting facilities that manufacture other firms’ designs. This may affect 
implementation due to the time needed for coordinating with the other firms (Salomon & 
Martin, 2008). 
Joint venture status. Relative to wholly owned plants, joint ventures are likely to 
suffer from communication and knowledge-sharing difficulties across partners, which 
should increase time-to-build (Kogut & Zander 1992, 1993). However, in Salomon and 
Martin’s (2008) study of semiconductor plant startups, they concluded that joint ventures 
may also allow partners to pool complementary resources and thus ease facility 
construction (Mitchell, 1989). 
Domestic v. foreign status of parent firm. Organizational factors relevant to time-
to-build include the domestic/foreign status of the parent firm and a firm’s ability to 
benefit from various sources of experience (Salomon & Martin, 2008). Through their 
impact on the process of knowledge deployment, these factors can significantly influence 
the time it takes a firm to build its facilities. Scholars in the international business 
literature argue that foreign firms face disadvantages relative to domestic firms operating 
in their home environment. This is referred to as the “liability of foreignness” (Zaheer, 
1995). Foreign investors bear additional costs due to information asymmetries, cultural 
differences, coordination difficulties, and local biases (Caves, 1996; Martin & Salomon, 
2003a; Zaheer, 1995). Empirical results consistent with this theory show that foreign 
firms generally have higher labor costs (Lipsey, 1994; Mincer & Higuchi, 1988), are 
subject to more lawsuits (Mezias, 2002), take longer to achieve economies of scale in 
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production (Galbraith, 1990), suffer from lower profitability (Zaheer, 1995), and 
experience a higher probability of failure (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). Moreover, 
physical distance compounds the costs of deploying knowledge, and learning can be 
impeded when the source and recipient of the knowledge are not collocated—especially 
when they are in different countries (Galbraith, 1990; Hatch & Mowery, 1998; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992; Teece, 1977, 1981). For these reasons, we expect foreign plant investments 
to be subject to higher coordination and communication costs, which will translate into 
greater time-to-build. Salomon and Martin (2008) found in their study of semiconductor 
plant startups that plants owned by foreign parents take longer to build than their 
domestically owned counterparts. On average, it takes firms about 2.28 months longer to 
get plants operational in foreign locations. This result supports existing findings that 
demonstrate the substantial constraints that national differences place on knowledge 
implementation in new facilities (Galbraith, 1990; Martin & Salomon, 2003b; Teece 
1977, 1981). Furthermore, it provides additional empirical substantiation (and a precise 
estimate) of the liability of foreignness (e.g., Zaheer, 1995). However, it would be 
beneficial to conduct further research to determine when the negative effect of having a 
foreign parent company subsides. 
Knowledge transfer. Knowledge transfer has long occupied a prominent, if not 
always explicit, place in research on strategic management and corporate expansion 
(Salomon & Martin, 2008). Deploying and extending productive knowledge to new 
facilities is inherent in corporate growth. The speed and effectiveness of that process can 
determine a firm’s ability to penetrate new markets, preempt and respond to rivals, and 
adapt to market changes. Scholars have examined how knowledge transfer influences 
firm performance (e.g., Argote, 1999; Levin, 2000; Teece, 1977; Winter & Szulanski, 
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2001), how technology transfer considerations affect governance (e.g., Martin & 
Salomon 2003a; Mayer & Salomon, 2006), and under what conditions firms exploit 
knowledge across organizational and national boundaries (e.g., Edmondson et al., 2004; 
Galbraith, 1990; Ingram & Simons, 2002; Martin & Salomon, 2003b; Szulanski, 1996). 
However, little attention has been given to the process of deploying knowledge-based 
assets in new facilities, and how knowledge transfer impacts operational performance. A 
stream of studies going back at least to Argote and Epple (1990) and Argote, Beckman, 
and Epple (1990) has shown that experience with knowledge transfer results in learning 
that can improve productivity and quality (Bohn & Terwiesch, 1999; Hatch & Dyer, 
2004; Szulanski, 1996; Terwiesch & Bohn, 2001), decrease production costs (Darr et al., 
1995; Darr & Kurtzberg, 2000), increase innovative output (Hatch & Mowery, 1998; 
Salomon & Shaver, 2005; Salomon, 2006), improve profitability (Ingram & Simons, 
2002), and enhance survival (Ingram & Baum, 1997; Baum & Ingram, 1998). 
Organizational learning. Another organizational factor relevant for time-to-build 
is organizational learning (Salomon & Martin, 2008). In this study we view learning as a 
process of accumulating, encoding, and leveraging insights gleaned through experience 
(Argote, 1999; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988). Two forms of 
learning can be helpful. The first is experiential learning. This form of learning-by-doing 
accrues as a firm repeatedly engages in an activity (for a review, see Argote [1999]). In 
this context, the relevant experience is that which accrues from prior deployments (e.g., 
building previous plants). The second form of learning is based on industry-level 
experience. This type of learning refers to the insight that a firm gains as other firms  
“do” - i.e., by encoding the experience of others within the industry (Argote et al., 1990; 
Ghemawat & Spence, 1985; Ingram & Baum, 1997; Lieberman, 1987b). 
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With respect to learning from one’s own experience, past deployments develop a 
“discipline of practice” that creates more efficient replication routines (Nelson & Winter, 
1982, p. 77). This provides the opportunity for firms to encode experiences into routines 
that they may exploit when engaging in future deployments (Levitt & March, 1988; 
Martin & Salomon, 2003b; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Consistent with this intuition, Teece 
(1977) showed that the costs of transferring technological know-how across plants 
decreased in firm experience. Likewise, Galbraith (1990) found that prior experience 
resulted in greater productivity when transferring technology to new plants. More 
generally, we expect a firm’s experience to translate into enhanced efficiency when 
building new plants. 
Salomon and Martin (2008) found in their study of semiconductor plant startups 
that each prior domestic plant built by the firm prior to the focal investment decreases 
time-to-build by 7.2 days. Given that the sample average is almost 6, this equates to more 
than one month saved for a typical firm relative to an inexperienced firm building the 
same plant. This implies that domestic experience can provide the firm with a set of 
routines and/or templates that it may meaningfully employ in future projects (e.g., Jensen 
& Szulanski, 2007; Szulanski & Jensen, 2006). 
Cumulative industry experience. Besides learning from their own experiences, 
firms also learn from others (Argote et al. 1990, Ingram and Baum 1997, Baum and 
Ingram 1998). They benefit from accumulated industry expertise, in this case, the 
cumulative experience of those that have come before them (Argote, 1999; Argote et al., 
1990; Ghemawat & Spence, 1985; Lieberman, 1987b). Firms may learn by benchmarking 
competitors, hiring employees with an in-depth knowledge of industry practice, 
contracting with suppliers who have a long industry history, or via more informal 
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channels such as trade associations, industry conferences, and networking among 
scientists, managers, and engineers (Baum & Ingram 1998; Darr & Kurtzberg, 2000; Darr 
et al., 1995; Huber, 1991; Ingram & Baum, 1997). 
The greater the level of prior industry experience, the more any firm within the 
industry stands to benefit from a deeper understanding of the underlying technologies and 
the conditions for their use (Argote et al., 1990; Nelson & Winter, 1982). This familiarity 
can facilitate knowledge implementation in new facilities by mitigating the coordination 
and troubleshooting difficulties inherent in such deployments (Bohn & Terwiesch, 1999; 
Terwiesch & Bohn, 2001). Although industry-level learning has been connected to 
increased survival (Baum & Ingram, 1998; Ingram & Baum, 1997), decreased costs (Darr 
& Kurtzberg, 2000; Darr et al., 1995), and profitability (Ingram & Simons, 2002), to our 
knowledge, no study has examined its influence on efficiency in establishing new 
facilities. We therefore expect that industry-level experience will benefit firms and 
manifest as decreased time-to-build. 
Personnel needs during new plant startups. Lawler (1991) asserts that the 
creation of a new manufacturing location represents an excellent opportunity to apply a 
new management approach. In a new setting, all the systems in an organization can be 
designed from the beginning to be consistent with a particular management strategy. 
Whole new methods of organizing and managing work can be put into place virtually 
overnight. Due to pressures of globalization and increased performance standards related 
to quality, speed, and costs, Lawler advocates for a participative management approach 
wherein information, power, knowledge, and rewards are placed in the hands of 
individuals who are actually creating the products and services. The intention is to 
develop a high level of business involvement among all employees. The expectation is 
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that doing so will lead to performance improvements in speed, quality, and costs because 
lower level employees will be able to act more quickly and in a more informed, more 
motivated manner. This type of organization, Lawler explains, utilizes a flat design and 
extensive use of self-managing teams. He explains that this approach, 
is particularly important for business involvement that teams have the 
responsibility for producing a whole product or completely serving an identifiable 
customer base. Without this, it is impossible for individuals to feel that they have 
a business that they control in a bottom-line sense. In a manufacturing setting, a 
team needs to be given responsibility for producing an entire product and for 
dealing as directly as possible with both customers and suppliers. The teams, in 
essence, need to be responsible for all the value-added activities that occur with 
respect to a particular product. (p. 7) 
In creating teams, a clear bias needs to exist toward establishing a customer-
supplier relationship for each work team (Lawler, 1991). These can be internal customer-
supplier relationships; where possible, however, there is a definite advantage to creating 
external customer- supplier relationships. This provides the most "real" business 
experience for individuals and keeps them in contact with the competitive business 
environment that they are in and the kinds of demands that the organization face from its 
external markets and suppliers. 
To facilitate team management of a business, Lawler (1991) asserts that often it is 
important to use multi-functional teams when making decisions. This includes inserting 
staff support members in the production teams. For example, engineers and accountants 
may need to be placed on the teams so that the teams can handle a full scope of business 
issues and, in effect, operate as mini-business enterprises. 
Additionally, the physical layout of the facility should be designed to facilitate 
teams owning an entire product or customer (Lawler, 1991). Equipment needs to be 
positioned so that employees who are on the same teams are located together. Staff 
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support individuals need to be located in the production areas they support. Blocks to 
communication, including walls, need to be minimized or eliminated, as do all symbols 
that indicate differences in power and status. Hierarchical symbols work against all 
individuals feeling responsible for organizational success, and they encourage decision 
making on the basis of hierarchy rather than expertise. 
Lawler (1991) further adds that a critical element in any new plant - especially 
one that follows his approach by creating self-managing teams - is a strong organizational 
commitment to selection and training. This typically includes realistic job previews as 
well as team-based selection processes. But the Second Generation Approach, if 
anything, requires a greater commitment to selection and development. In the area of 
development, for example, it requires a commitment to individuals learning a great deal 
about quality technology. It also requires individuals to learn more about the business 
impact of their roles in the organization. This means they need to get extensive economic 
education, as well as being educated in the technical details of the manufacturing or 
service process. 
In essence, individuals in the production area need to be treated more like 
managers as far as the training, information, and pay rates they receive (Lawler, 1991). In 
terms of skill-based pay, they need to be able to progress higher in total compensation in 
return for learning vertical or upward skills. This has implications for the kind of 
individuals that are selected, since much more is expected of them than just the ability to 
work in a team and control a production process. They need to develop an understanding 
of the business. 
Lawler (1991) acknowledges that his approach demands a great deal of managers. 
They must be coaches, leaders, and expert resources. Getting the right kind of manager 
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cannot be left to chance. The selection process needs to be able to identify them—and of 
course, training and support should be available to them. In the area of selection, 
assessment centers and simulations can help to identify the right individuals. The training 
and development process needs to include peer and staff assessment data and behavioral 
learning experiences. 
Although Lawler’s (1991) suggestions are thought provoking, they likely have 
varying relevance across plant types. For example, within the rigid plastics industry and 
the study organization, in particular,  the systems and processes are standardized and the 
new plant does not have the opportunity to make changes. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 2 provided a discussion of the rigid plastics industry and new plant 
startups. Particular attention was dedicated to factors that influence the time to build new 
plants and the time it takes for the new plant to become operational. Four main factors 
were identified as having a large influence on these variables. One such factor is the 
support a new plant receives from its parent company in terms of leveraging project 
management expertise and experience. This includes assistance with the layout of the 
plant, work organization, recruiting and training, and performance incentives. 
Additionally, parent companies often support new plants by providing senior managers 
and skilled technical workers for the plant startup phase. 
The second factor that influences time to build is the level of complexity of the 
technology used in the new plant. Solomon and Martin (2008) found that the level of 
difficulty and the level of complexity of the technology used in the new plant immensely 
affect the process and the time needed to get the plant operational. The third relevant 
factor that influences the time to become operational is knowledge transfer as deploying 
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and extending productive knowledge is crucial to the success of a new plant startup. The 
forth factor is organizational learning, which is seen as a process of accumulating, 
encoding, and leveraging insights gleaned through experience (Argote, 1999; Fiol & 
Lyles, 1985; Levitt & March, 1988; Huber, 1991). 
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Chapter 3 
Methods 
The purpose of this study was to identify what personnel need to rapidly achieve 
steady and sustainable performance during the startup phase of a new manufacturing 
facility in the rigid plastics packaging industry. Four research questions were examined: 
1. What were employees’ impressions of the startup experience? 
2. What recommendations do employees provide regarding the type of 
leadership needed for a new plant startup? 
3. What recommendations do employees provide regarding training and 
knowledge sharing needed for a new plant startup? 
4. What recommendations do employees provide regarding the 
organizational systems and support needed for a new plant startup? 
This chapter describes the methods that were used in the present study. The 
research design is described first, followed by a discussion of the procedures related to 
participant selection, assuring confidentiality and consent, collecting data, and analyzing 
data. 
Research Design 
A qualitative approach was used for this study. This approach is mainly used for 
gathering and analyzing data with the goal to have a thorough and convincing way to 
approach this topic (Creswell, 2013). The qualitative method approach allows a deep dive 
in exploring the topic of study. Kvale (1996) mentioned in his research papers that the 
qualitative approach allows researchers to represent the true complexity and nuances of 
human experience in its most authentic form. In this study we used the method of 
research interviewing as the main method as it allows for probing questions of the 
participants’ feeling, thoughts, and experiences in a way which offers an opportunity for 
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going really deep. Data in this study was collected by structured one-on-one interviews 
and by using a short demographic questionnaire. 
Participants 
A sample of 13 employees who played a role in the new plant startup took part in 
the study. Of these, eight were supervisory, quality assurance, forklift, or technical 
personnel. The remaining five participants were US-based internal corporate plant 
consultants, trainers, and support personnel. The aim of participant selection was to 
recruit a diverse group of employees that spanned several functional areas. 
Length of service information was used to identify employees who were working 
at the production facility at the time of the startup phase. The official start of production 
was in August 2013. Due to a high turnover, only 22 people were eligible to participate in 
the study. In collaboration with human resources, 10 individuals were identified as 
possible candidates to invite to participate in the study. One was out of town at the time 
of the interviews and one was needed on the production floor. Ultimately, eight plant 
employees were available and completed an interview. 
Confidentiality and Consent Procedures 
All human subjects protections were observed as part of this study. In keeping 
with these procedures, participants received complete information regarding the benefits 
and risks of their participation. They were advised that their participation was voluntary, 
confidential, and protected under the extent of the laws of California. Consent 
information provided to participants described the study purpose, the procedures involved 
in the study, and the time required for participation. Risks of participation and safeguards 
for mitigating the risks were outlined. Participants were informed they could withdraw 
from the study or refuse to answer a question at any time. No hard copies of the data were 
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produced. Audio-recordings of the interviews were created and kept until transcripts were 
created and verified. Then, the audio-recordings were destroyed. Electronic forms of the 
data were de-identified and will be kept for 5 years and then deleted. 
Data Collection Procedures 
The 21-question interview script (see Appendix) was created to gather 
information to help answer the research questions. The script gathered data related to five 
topics: 
1. Participant demographics. The first nine questions of the interview gathered 
participants’ demographic details, including their age, tenure, gender, 
educational attainment, first position at the company, current position at the 
company, supervisor for their first year of employment, number of startups 
they have experienced, and role they played during the ABC startup. 
2. Impressions of the startup experience. Participants were asked about their 
experience with the plant startup in order to identify their general impressions, 
successful aspects of the startup, and challenging aspects of startup as they 
related to leadership, training, and organizational systems. For example, 
Question 11 asked, “Looking at the startup of the ABC plant from an overall 
perspective, what would you say went well?” 
3. Recommendations for type of leadership needed for a new plant startup. 
Participants were asked to describe the type of leadership needed for the 
startup. For example, Question 13 asked, “Is there anything you would have 
liked the plant manager do differently? If yes, what is that?” 
4. Recommendations for training and knowledge sharing needed in a new plant 
startup. Participants were asked to provide their recommendations related to 
training staff and promoting knowledge sharing. For example, Question 14 
asked, “Looking at the training for new employees, what went really well?” 
5. Recommendations for organizational systems and support needed at a new 
plant startup. Participants were asked to provide their recommendations 
related to organizational systems and support during a startup. For example, 
Question 16 asked, “Is there any support you didn’t have that wish you did?” 
Interviews were conducted one-on-one and in person onsite at ABC plant within a 
private conference room. The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. 
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Data Analysis Procedures 
Content analysis as described by Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2013) was used 
to examine the qualitative data. The following steps were followed: 
1. The transcript of each interviewee was reviewed several times in order to get 
familiar with the scope and nature of the data that emerged from the 
interviews. 
2. Several rounds of coding were conducted. During the first round, each 
response was reviewed and discrete ideas were identified and assigned a 
theme. 
3. After the first round of coding was complete, the themes and associated data 
were reviewed and reorganized to reflect a hierarchy of themes that aligned 
with the research questions. For example, themes related to leader selection 
and leader preparation were grouped under recommendations leadership, in 
answer to Research Question 2. This activity constituted the second round of 
coding. 
4. When both rounds of coding were complete, the analysis was reviewed and 
revised as needed for accuracy. 
5. When the analysis was verified, the number of participants reporting each 
theme was determined. 
6. Finally, the analysis was submitted to a second rater who reviewed the 
analysis and pointed out any detected errors. The results captured in chapter 4 
show the final analysis. 
Summary 
This chapter described the methods used in the study. This qualitative study 
gathered data through 13 interviews. Participants were asked to provide their impressions 
of the startup experience and recommendations for the type of leadership, training and 
knowledge sharing, and organizational systems and support needed for a new plant 
startup. The next chapter reports the study findings. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
The purpose of this study was to identify what personnel need in order to rapidly 
achieve steady and sustainable performance during the startup phase of a new 
manufacturing facility in the rigid plastics packaging industry. Four research questions 
were examined: 
1. What were employees’ impressions of the startup experience? 
2. What recommendations do employees provide regarding the type of 
leadership needed for a new plant startup? 
3. What recommendations do employees provide regarding training and 
knowledge sharing needed for a new plant startup? 
4. What recommendations do employees provide regarding the 
organizational systems and support needed for a new plant startup? 
This chapter reports the results of the study. Participant demographics are 
provided first. Thereafter, the findings are reported by research question. 
Participant Demographics 
A total of 13 individuals were interviewed for this study. Of these, the majority 
were male (n = 11), aged 40-55 (n = 8), employed with the company 4 years or less (n = 
8), and had completed some college (n = 7). Participant demographics are presented in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 
Participant Demographics 
Gender Age Tenure Educational Attainment 
Female: 2 
Male: 11 
18 – 25: 0 
26 – 39: 5 
40 – 55: 8 
56+: 0  
0 – 4 years: 8 
5 – 9 years: 1 
10 – 14 years: 2 
15+ years: 2  
High school: 4 
Some college: 7 
Bachelor Degree: 2 
Master’s Degree or above: 0  
N = 13 
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Employees’ Impressions of the Startup Experience 
Participants were asked to describe the successful and challenging aspects of the 
plant startup and to compare the ABC startup to other plant startups at the company. The 
findings are reported in the sections below. 
Successful aspects. Participants were asked to identify and describe the aspects of 
the plant startup they believed to be successful. Participants identified several successes 
relating to the plant manager, training and support, and organizational systems during the 
early stage of the startup (see Table 2). Six participants stated that the plant manager was 
initially present and supportive on the plant floor. One participant shared, 
[Plant manager name] stayed on the floor when I was there. He tried to help out as 
much as he could, even though it was new to him too, even though he came from 
the other company. But he tried to help out and everybody tried. 
Table 2 
Early Startup Phase Successes 
Successful Aspect n 
Plant manager was initially present and supportive on floor 6 
Training and Support  
Technical training from corporate academy in Iowa was effective 12 
Onsite training and support was effective 10 
Support and training from corporate in Austria 7 
High employee morale and effective teamwork 3 
Organizational Systems  
Employee recognition was provided 
Provided recognition and appreciation through bringing food or taking them out 
(4) 
Provided verbal recognition (3) 
Recognition boosted morale (1) 
7 
Communication initially was effective 3 
Installation of blow molding machines went very well 2 
N = 13 
Another participant expressed, 
He was involved in pretty much everything. I don’t know about the stuff in the 
office, but he was always on the floor trying to make sure that we had everything 
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that we [needed], and he was also good with the people and made sure that with 
the customer, he tried to make sure that we understood everything. He would try 
to learn also. He was very involved. He was on the floor all the time. 
Note that no successes were reported for the later phase. 
Related to training and support, participants identified four early phase successes. 
Twelve of the 13 participants expressed that technical training from the corporate 
academy in Iowa was effective. One participant stated the following, 
When I went to training in Iowa, the thing I liked about it is they take you on the 
floor and show you how the machines work. Basically they give you a machine 
and start up and stop the machine. And they show you how to put the head on. . . . 
It was a lot of hands on training. That’s the best, for me. I don’t know for other 
people. That worked pretty well—the hands on. The color change. The head 
change. 
Another participant commented, 
We were at an operating plant, so we didn’t always get a machine when we 
wanted one, but I thought they did a really good job of accommodating us and 
working around our schedule and making changeovers happen, getting us 
involved as much as possible. I have nothing but positive to say, really. . . . Iowa 
City was great. They treated us fantastic. There’s not a negative thing I can say. I 
still talk to [employee name] to this day. I appreciate everything they did for us. 
They were fantastic. Couldn’t have treated us better. . . . The training was 
effective. 
A second commonly cited success (n = 10) was that the onsite training and 
support was effective. A participant noted the following, 
I found it to be very helpful to me personally because they would come in with a 
different set of eyes to see something that you didn’t see, or they would bring 
their way in to doing something that perhaps it was easier. I found it helpful. I 
really did. I think it was a major reason why our plant eventually turned around 
A second participant explained, 
We had good tech support. [Employee name] came and spent a couple of months 
with us after the training. He was reinforcing his training. He was having to re-
learn our bottles as well. [Employee name] was with us for almost the first year 
we were starting up. He basically lived here. Without him, I don’t know if we 
would have survived, to be quite honest. I owe a great debt to [employee name], 
seriously. . . . 
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Additionally, seven participants stated that support and training from experts from 
corporate in Austria has been helpful. One participant expressed the following, 
We had two guys in, they came from [corporate location name], [employee 
names], I learned a lot from them. Troubleshooting. That’s what I learned from 
them. . . . When I had a question I’d go to them. They knew most of it. You go to 
them with a question and they show you. That kind of support was good, and the 
training itself. 
Another participant stated, 
They played an important role on all the training, and plus the set up and 
everything. The bottle was developed in Europe. They stayed 7 or 8 months to 
train, to make sure everybody knew what was going on, with training. So they did 
a good job. . . . It was crucial that they were there, because we never ran this 
bottle in the United States. It was a new bottle. Dual neck chamber bottle. A 
complex bottle. 
Regarding successes related to organizational systems, seven participants pointed 
out that employee recognition in the early startup phase was provided in various ways, 
such as bringing food or taking them out or providing verbal recognition. One participant 
mentioned the following, 
Yes, I felt recognized. Just being told that you did a good job or “Thanks for your 
input.” Stuff like that means a lot to people. They still do the recognition here. 
When we first started doing even the recognition out on the floor it made people 
feel so good. “They took notice of what I did.” Just telling people they did a good 
job and that. I got that a lot here. 
It is notable that participants did not cite any successes related to the later stages 
of the startup. 
Challenging aspects. Participants were asked to express their thoughts about the 
challenging aspects in regards to plant leadership during the early stage of the startup (see 
Table 3). They identified two areas of concern, which relate to the plant manager and the 
maintenance manager. Five participants out of 13 felt that the plant manager did not 
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adjust well to the company culture and to the common company practices. One 
participant shared, 
I think leadership was there but you can’t make somebody do right if they’re 
going to do right. It’s a mindset. Not everybody is a team player. There are going 
to be some people, regardless of how many people you’ve got, they’re going to do 
it their way no matter what. 
Table 3 
Early Startup Phase Leadership Challenges 
Leadership Challenge n 
Plant manager did not adjust to company culture and agenda 5 
Maintenance manager was not a good fit 3 
N = 13 
Another participant stated the following, 
There were a couple of comments from the plant floor that all [plant manager 
name] did was look out his window with his arms folded looking down at 
everybody. That kind of bugged me. It creates a hierarchy. Big brother’s watching 
you. That got me. . . . I didn’t see [plant manager name] interacting with the 
managers and trying to help them out or give them guidance. He wanted to just let 
them go and that was it. He didn’t have good interaction with them at all. He 
didn’t lead the managers 
In regards to the second person, the maintenance manager at that time, three 
participants were concerned about the right fit for the company. One participant stated the 
following, 
A maintenance manager should gather information on how the equipment works 
and then share it with his people. I think that’s leadership. You’ve got to know 
what you know and share what you know. Share and train the maintenance 
people. . . . I think where we had a little bit of situation was in maintenance, with 
the maintenance manager, that’s the only thing . . . he didn’t know what he was 
doing. 
Another challenging aspect the participants were questioned about were personnel 
challenges in the early startup phase (see Table 4). Two main challenges were found, one 
was in the area of staffing and the other one in the area of training. Related to staffing, 
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participants mentioned three early startup phase staffing challenges. Eight out of 13 
participants were mentioning the two main challenges of not filling the open positions in 
a timely manner and the high turnover. One participant cited the following, 
Maintenance had people there helping to train, and they went through some 
training, but they were lacking more on people. They only had 3 maintenance 
guys at the beginning. . . . We lost one of those guys in about a month after 
coming back from the external training site. Down to two maintenance guys. All 
that time spent working with that guy was wasted, or dropped off. There wasn’t 
enough people to begin with to then train. 
Table 4 
Early Startup Phase Personnel Challenges 
Personnel Challenge n 
Staffing  
Did not fill open positions in a timely manner 4 
High turnover was a challenge 4 
Setup challenges in warehouse due to lack of knowledgeable personnel 1 
Training  
Lack of standardized training across locations and trainers 6 
Lack of training processes to ensure adequate documentation, evaluation, and 
knowledge transfer 
5 
Insufficient supplementary support for maintenance and secondary packaging 5 
Training and documentation from suppliers for secondary packaging equipment 
were insufficient 
3 
Later hires did not receive the same in-depth training as received by initial new 
hires 
2 
Insufficient training for toolmaker 1 
Training received at training location in Iowa partly did not apply to new bottle 1 
Insufficient ongoing training for maintenance 1 
N = 13 
Another participant stated, 
We simply couldn’t fill the positions with competent people. Therefore we went 
through a phase of kind of having to rely upon the temp agencies. Which was a 
challenge. And the few people we actually had hired on, that started from the 
beginning that was really all we had. We had a couple of people on each shift. 
Full-timers. Everybody else were temps. It was just a revolving door. 
Participants cited a number of challenges related to training; however, several of 
these were mentioned by only one or a few individuals. 
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The main challenges were identified as lack of standardization of training across 
the locations and between trainers, lack of training processes to ensure adequate 
documentation, evaluation and knowledge transfer. Six out of 13 participants believe that 
there has been a challenge with the level of training standardization. One participant 
described the following, 
In regards to training we had a lot of back and forth of people saying, “Touch this 
and don’t touch that” or one person saying, “You can touch this. Do this this way” 
and the other person saying, “Don’t touch that.” . . . If you’re going to be an 
operator, you should be allowed to operate. We had a lot of opposite messages. 
Some are still going on a little bit. It makes them not sure on what they’re doing 
because this guy is telling them to do it this way and this guy is telling them to do 
it the opposite way. It’s confusing. 
A second participant mentioned, 
There was also an issue with the support people of not everyone being on the 
same page as far as telling people different things. I was in [plant name], I did 
things one way. [Employee name] was in [plant name], they do something 
different. [Employee name] was in [plant name] they do something different. So I 
had talked to operators and they said, “[Employee name] told me to do it this way. 
You’re telling me to do it this way.” I think this is on the processing and mold 
change side . . . not so much on the maintenance side. 
In regards to the challenge of lack of training processes to ensure adequate 
documentation, evaluation and knowledge transfer, we had five out of the 13 participants 
mentioning this challenge. One participant described the following, 
The hand over from the plant where the initial training was done to the Startup 
plant wasn’t as good. Lack of training evaluation / training progress and 
documentation. Knowing what level the technical trainees were at when they first 
got to [plant name]. I didn’t know whether they were a level 1 operator or a 2, 
what skill level they were. No training matrix or training evaluation document 
was transferred with them. I didn’t know what skill level they were at. I could 
have been over training the person. They were brand new, and I didn’t have any 
paperwork to let me know. 
Another participant mentioned, 
But one thing that hurt us was that we didn’t have any troubleshooting training at 
training plant. So when we got back here, and we got flash on a bottle, we didn’t 
have a clue on how to get rid of it. We’d look at each other. [Employee name] 
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would say, “Cut the air back?” “How do you know? Don’t tell me what to do. 
Why do you know what to do?!” That was the biggest thing, the troubleshooting. 
The last training challenge to mention relates to insufficient supplementary 
support for maintenance and secondary packaging, which was mentioned by five out of 
13 participants. One participant noted the following, 
Again, 95% of our frustration was from any kind of lack of understanding of our 
downstream equipment. That was 95% of our frustration. It just seemed like 
nobody really knew what to do, and who to send, so we were left to struggle with 
it. People did come, but nobody really knew what to do. Nobody really knew 
what to do about our downstream because nobody else was familiar with it. It was 
so different. 
A second participant pointed out, 
The support of the downstream was missing. We had plenty upstream as far as 
blow molding operators and stuff. . . . It had to be the vendors because you can’t 
have somebody from another plant come in and show our guys what to do. On the 
blow molding machines and stuff we had plenty of support up front but the back 
end didn’t have that support. If it had been a regular set up where they ran down 
into a box, I’d say we’d been run 90% within the first year, but it’s not. We’ve got 
all this different equipment, and a lot of turnover, and it seems like once 
somebody gets trained and knows what they’re doing they move on. 
The participants also identified several challenges in the area of organizational 
systems in the early stage of the startup phase (see Table 5). The two main challenges are 
seen in the area of secondary packaging equipment and with the infrastructure, setup and 
processing of the blow molding machines. 
Focusing on the secondary packaging equipment first, there are three areas of 
concern. Seven participants out of 13 identified a challenge with the design, set-up, 
support level and the insufficient reliability from the supplier. One participant explained 
the following, 
I recall that the packaging just wasn’t set up. That was the biggest thing. At this 
time we were sampling Machine Number One. So we went straight into sampling 
mode. We had the guys working with that, so I started setting up boards for 5S. 
Areas where we were going to store stuff, and started laying out the floor and the 
mold shop with the expert from corporate in Austria. We started laying out what 
41 
 
was going to be. Number Two was a shell. They were making that up. Number 
Three was coming in. It was still one machine moving to the second to the third. . 
. . There was just no coordination. The Dyco wasn’t ready, the labelers weren’t 
performing, the spouters weren’t performing. Just complete chaos. 
Table 5 
Early Startup Phase Organizational Systems Challenges 
Organization Systems Challenge n 
Secondary packaging equipment challenges  
Design, set up, support level, and supplier reliability was insufficient 7 
Was overly complex, leading to scheduling pressure 6 
Was not operating effectively 4 
Infrastructure, setup, and processing challenges related to blow molding machines 8 
Lacked organizational policies and procedures 3 
Physical plant lacked needed infrastructure for the first two months 3 
Employee recognition was lacking 2 
Lacked production manager due to financial constraints 1 
N = 13 
Another participant noted, 
There was a lot of confusion for the downstream. Trying to figure out how to set 
things up, where everything was supposed to go, because there wasn’t a clear 
picture of the schematics as far as the conveyors, how the machines were 
supposed to sit. We would spend sometimes a day or two. We would get a 
machine set into the position we thought it was supposed to be in and then we 
would have to move it over this way or we would have to move it a little bit more. 
So it was just a little bit of confusion because like you said ABC was unique as 
far as downstream and nobody really knew exactly what was going on. It was not 
a clear set up. There were a few people that knew. 
Six out of 13 participants described the overly complex secondary packaging 
equipment and the challenges we had to face. One participant mentioned the following, 
I think with that also they didn’t take into account how complex the downstream 
was. We focused on the blow molding machines. That was fine, but truthfully 
they are 25% of that plant’s downstream. We loaded up 80-90 per cent of our 
people on the front, and 10% taking over 70% of the plant. They underestimated. 
I don’t think anyone realized how complex it was going to be. A lot of new 
equipment. Spouters we hadn’t used in other plants. Labelers, not only was it a 
model we don’t really use, it was a technology we don’t really use. That’s the 
only in-line downstream labeling that I know of in North America. We 
underestimated the technology on the downstream a lot. 
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Another participant stated the following, 
The downstream. The sheer timing and the complexity of the downstream was the 
problem. I’m not one to know when the project was launched but we were miles 
behind with the Dyco. I think that went on for many months after the start. About 
a year after the startup we maximized that. 
The third challenge in regards to the secondary packaging equipment describes 
the ongoing challenge of the equipment not being operational. This has been stated by 
four out of 13 participants. One participant cited, 
I think we let the employees down with the downstream. It was awful. To go in 
there every day that was bad. When we got there at the beginning they were 
puffing their chests out and they were really enthusiastic and I think it just fell 
apart. I really do. . . . But the downstream was just such a disaster. 
Another participant mentioned, 
At the beginning, even when the downstream put us in such a position, for a 
couple of months everybody was upbeat. We knew things were going to get 
better. We thought after two or three months we were finally going to get there. 
Turned into four months, five months, and six months. It really wore us out. 
Every day you came back to work, it was like a whole new day because we had a 
fresh set of temps. Nobody wanted to be here for 12 hours hand stacking boxes. 
Another main challenge in regards to organizational systems has been the 
infrastructure, the setup, and the processing of the blow molding machines. Eight out of 
13 participants mentioned this challenge. One participants noted, 
Initially there were major problems with the infrastructure. . . . The machines kept 
going down. . . . Consequence of infrastructure being down: There were ongoing 
problems with the temperature in the compressor room that they were working on. 
I remember when we came back we were still fixing that. 
A second employee mentioned, 
We had a lot of headaches starting up, just getting the bottle right. That surprised 
me more than anything. The bottle size and just the environment had a lot to do 
with it. Our water was different. Humidity is different. On the floor we’re running 
about 75% humidity right now. That’s going to give you orange peel and 
everything else. 
43 
 
Until now the focus has been on the early stage of the startup. The next section is 
going to mention the challenges during the late stage of the startup (Table 6). This 
includes leadership challenges and organizational system challenges. Two out of 13 
participants mentioned that the plant manager got disengaged during the late phase of the 
startup. One participant described the following, 
As the months wore on you could tell [plant manager name] was getting more 
frustrated and the recognition part was slowly kind of fading away. . . . He was 
frustrated but at the same time he was being upbeat to the group. It was things out 
of his control, things we are still challenged by now. He thought it would be 
easier to recruit people to work here, to start off. 
Table 6 
Later Startup Phase Challenges 
Challenge n 
Leadership challenges  
Plant manager disengagement 2 
Introduction of new performance targets during leadership change  1 
Organizational systems challenges  
Struggle with communication as shifts were added 10 
Employees did not receive recognition 5 
Rumors about plant closure decreased employee morale 1 
N = 13 
In regards to the plant communication, 10 out of 13 participants noted that with 
added complexity in terms of moving from a one shift model to a two shift model and 
eventually to a four shift model had an effect on the effectiveness of the plant 
communication. One participant commented the following, 
Even when we were on day shift, the communication wasn’t that great. I was at 
home one day. [Employee name] called me. “Oh by the way, we split up the 
schedule. We’re doing twelve hour shifts.” [Employee name], I think, was 
working Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and they had me and somebody else 
working Thursday, Friday, Saturday. We was going to be down on Sunday. I was 
off that week and he just found out about it. I was planning on coming in the next 
day and just, bam. I guess that goes with the startup of [customer name] Sun, what 
they expected us to be running. They just didn’t know. 
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Another participant commented on the following: 
The night shift didn’t get a lot of information. . . . Night shift would be here, and 
sometimes things would happen on my shift that wouldn’t happen on the other, 
and I would send out a general email, of the daily meetings, what all happened. 
He [plant manager name] didn’t like that. I don’t know why. But nothing was 
really being communicated. It wasn’t until current plant manager got on . . . . He 
sends out a detailed list every day, so that people are hearing the same 
information. Which is something I tried to do from the start but it was just 
frowned upon for some reason. But now we do it. That was a big frustration for 
the first 2.5 years. It was a struggle for night shift or even opposing day shifts, to 
have consistent information. Things they would be talking about today, then may 
not be talking about in a couple of days. Those shifts wouldn’t hear it. 
Comparison of ABC plant to other plants at the company. Participants were 
also asked to compare the ABC startup with other company startup situations (see Table 
7). Not all participants have had a chance to be part of several company startups therefore 
there are only few responses. Three out of 13 participants mentioned that they could 
observe a cultural difference between the ABC startup and other company startups. One 
participant mentioned the following, 
Communication from management down to the employees was different from 
other plants. Majority of other plants we have usually a senior person from the 
company spending more time with whomever is being trained. So he 
communicates while he is with them. He [plant manager name] was trying to do it 
by himself. When we have someone like [employee name] or somebody in that 
position that we’re familiar with, that helps out and communicates back and forth 
to us on the floor. 
Table 7 
Comparison of ABC Startup to Other Plant Startups at Company 
Comparison n 
Culture and processes were inconsistent with other plants at the company 3 
Higher level of complexity in terms of new bottle and secondary packaging 
equipment 
2 
Had more difficulty filling positions at needed times 1 
Leadership and key positions not staffed appropriately to deal with typical technical 
challenges of startup 
1 
N = 13 
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Another participant expressed the following, 
[Plant manager name] was a new person, not a [company name] person. 
Communication the way [plant manager name] does things and the way we did 
them is totally different. The [company name] way wasn’t there until they came 
later on and tried to implement it. [Plant manager name] had already had them 
molded the way he wanted them, so we had to remold them, which made it a 
whole lot difficult. 
Two participants out of 13 stated that the level of complexity of the secondary 
packaging equipment is considerably higher than in most of the other company plants. 
One participant explained the following, 
It was different, because it was a new bottle for [company name], overall. . . . The 
downstream was different compared to most of our other startups. It was an 
outside labeler. We’re not used to doing IML heat labelling. That was different. 
We had four or five different equipment that was new to the [company name] that 
we all had to learn. You had the dual neck bottle, the capper which we had in the 
[different plant location] but it was different in [plant location], we had an outside 
labeler that was different, and also the palletizer. 
Recommendations Regarding Leadership 
Four recommendations were identified by participants related to leader selection 
and preparation (see Table 8): competencies needed, qualification and leadership style, 
onboarding training, and startup support for startup plant manager during the early and 
the late phase of the startup. 
Six out of 13 participants felt strongly about certain people skills such as hands-
on management style, treat employees with respect, have a vision and a clear direction, 
be able to motivate employees, possess strong problem solving skills, show appreciation 
and recognize employees, communicate effectively, set and communicate clear 
expectations, and display a positive attitude. One participant stated the following: “A 
leader has to show that he knows and show what he knows and lead them in the right 
direction”. Another participant mentioned 
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I think if a team on the floor doesn’t respect their leader, and there’s not a mutual 
respect, I don’t think it goes as well as it does when there’s respect for your 
leader, and when there’s respect from your leader to the shop floor. You can say 
leadership training, management training, but what do you mean by that in a 
startup situation? It’s very different to running a plant than running an established 
plant. 
Table 8 
Leader Selection and Preparation Recommendations 
Theme n 
Screen for needed competencies  
People skills 6 
Ability to troubleshoot equipment problems 2 
Ability to manage customers and contractors 1 
Screen for qualifications and style  
Embraces company culture and practices 7 
Has adequate technical background 4 
Leads by example 1 
Adjust onboarding training  
Include exposure to well-running and poorly running plants 3 
Include visits to equipment suppliers 2 
Provide support for startup plant manager during early and later startup phases  
Communicate clear expectations, goals, and performance evaluation procedures 9 
Assign a mentor 5 
Support relationship building between plant manager and customers 2 
N = 13 
Seven participants out of 13 stated the importance for the startup plant manager to 
embrace the company culture and company practices. One participant described it as 
follows: 
The new startup plant manager needs to have someone at his side who is be able 
to show him how to do things the [company name] way. . . . Preparation-wise, be 
more with the people. . . . [Plant manager name] may have been affected by his 
training, but he still did it his way. Personality thing. 
Another topic in regards to the qualifications for a startup plant manager talked 
about the necessity of the startup plant manager of having a technical background. Four 
out of 13 participants answered this question. One participant expressed the following 
thought: 
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Participants also answered the question on how to improve the onboarding 
training for a startup plant manager. Three out of 13 participants felt quite strongly that a 
startup plant manager should have spent some time in a well-running plant as and in a 
poorly-running plant. One participant mentioned the following, 
Yes, send him to a well-running plant like [plant name]. This is how a plant 
should run. But send him to a plant that’s struggling, or one that’s been struggling 
and is coming out of it a bit. It’s all fresh in those people’s minds. “Hey, this is 
where we were, and this is what we had to do and this is what we had to put in 
place.” Even send him to newer plant startups. . . . Just talk to the people who 
have been through plant startups and the frustration they see of a struggling plant. 
Also two participants out of 13 emphasized the importance of paying a visit to the 
equipment suppliers, for the blow molding machines as well as for the secondary 
packaging equipment. One participant answered the following, “Visiting the supplier for 
the blow molding machines might be helpful - depending on machines. . . . We even went 
to [supplier name] and looked at the heads and some of the other stuff there.” Another 
participant stated, 
When I’d mentioned that we should have visited the plant of the vendors, he 
[plant manager name] to wished that he’d gone and seen the exact machinery in 
operation. Talk to the people on the lines. See what kind of machinery they have. 
Ease of operations. They give us a kind of estimated expectation of what it takes 
to run it but seeing people actually do it. 
Participants also answered the questions on how to best support a startup plant 
manager during the early and late start up phases. Nine participants pointed out the 
importance of providing clear expectations, goals and performance evaluation 
procedures. One participant mentioned the following, 
A plant manager needs to know the expectations, and the reality. Sometimes the 
learning curve is getting from the reality to what the expectation is. Certainly 
some opportunities for training, development, setting expectations on future 
trainee operations managers or plant managers. 
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Five out of 13 participants suggested to support the startup plant manager during 
the early and later startup phase with an individual program, such as a buddy system, a 
mentoring program or a professional coach. One participant stated the following, 
I think a buddy support system for new startup plant managers is critical. As 
much just to listen to frustrations. . . . It’s got to be a buddy not a critic. . . . I think 
we have to have the person be a shoulder to cry on and somebody to say, “No you 
don’t want to do that. Let’s go this way.” 
Recommendations Regarding Training and Knowledge Sharing 
Participants were asked to provide recommendations regarding training and 
knowledge sharing (see Table 9). They focused on three topics: Assure that each 
functional area has sufficient training resources, ensure training schedule do not cut into 
weekends, and optimize training resources and materials.  
Table 9 
Training and Knowledge Sharing Recommendations 
Recommendation n 
Assure each functional area has sufficient training resources 6 
Ensure training schedules do not cut into weekends 2 
Optimize training resources and materials  
Assure an adequate blend of hands-on, classroom, and online learning 4 
Assure that training location, mix of attendees, and topics support later 
performance 
3 
Improve training documentation to support transfer of training 2 
Improve trainer selection and preparation 2 
N = 13 
Six out of 13 participants said it was important to ensure that each functional area 
had sufficient training resources available. One participant mentioned, 
We definitely need more training. The training for machine operators is very well. 
I’ll agree with that, but on the packaging end, there’s really nobody to train the 
packers and that. It’s up to the supervisors who are just learning too to train the 
new people, so I think that was our biggest problem, figuring out how to train a 
team lead to be a team lead on what’s expected from them. Role clarity played a 
big part. All the positions. 
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Another participant commented on the following, 
Downstream training could have been better. It didn’t go that well. I think the 
problem with that some of the equipment that came on site wasn’t ready to go into 
production. So how can you train someone on a piece of equipment that’s not 
ready to run? They’re still making program changes, they’re still making 
hardware changes. Priorities changed very quickly. So it is confusing to people. 
Participants had a variety of ideas in regards to optimization of training resources 
and some saw a need to improve training material. Four out of 13 participants 
recommended to assure an adequate blend of hands-on, classroom ad online learning. 
One participant explained the following, 
Use E-Learning, there’s so much that can happen on those machines that you can 
never learn it. I always tell everybody, “The only day you’ll stop learning is when 
you’re dead.” And you have to be susceptible to understand that you’re never 
going to know everything. E-learning would be nice. The last place I worked we 
had online training, to where you could log onto a computer. 
Another participant believed, 
I’ve noticed a lot of employees here complain about their training. . . . Maybe we 
could create problems and train them on how to fix it may be a good issue to look 
at. Disc brakes, or whatever, and then have them fix it hands on. People here are 
more hands on than looking at a paper. And you learn faster hands-on. As far as 
training goes I think that would help, if we had some kind of procedure on 
working on the equipment and creating the issues instead of just saying it or 
telling them or showing them on paper. I think they would learn better like that. 
Three out of 13 participants recommended to assure that the training location, the 
mix of attendees, and topics support later performance. One participant described the 
following, 
Should have the technical machine training in a plant which runs similar bottles. 
So the trainees had the training on the machines but when they came to [plant 
name] they had the bigger bottles, so they had to be retrained again because we 
were doing a different kind of process. It is about the bottle size. . . . Suggestion is 
to choose a plant with similar bottles. 
Another participant identified a need for the following, 
The problem was we were trained the machine operators and maintenance in 
different locations. That might be something we can look at in the future. . . . The 
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idea is to train machine operators and maintenance technicians in the same plant 
and maybe have a second group of machine operators and maintenance at another 
plant. Yes, at another plant, where we can have a happy spread. It helps to build 
the rapport. Most of these guys don’t know each other so it helps build up that 
team spirit. 
Participants had several suggestions around the topic of the support people 
coming into the plant (see Table 10). The first topic is about the coordination and 
communication of the support people. 
Table 10 
Support System Recommendations 
Support Recommendation n 
Coordinate and communicate schedule for visiting support staff  
Ensure clear communication about visiting support staff at all plant levels 6 
Provide support staff with clear directions and expectations for their visit 4 
Create and maintain detailed schedule of visiting support staff to ensure seamless 
coverage 
4 
Encourage US corporate leaders to be more present on floor when visiting plant 1 
Ensure support staff receives ongoing training and development 5 
N = 13 
 
Six out of 13 participants suggested that there needs to be a better communication 
about the support people visiting the plant. One participant believed the following, 
It needs to be communicated: Who they are, what they are, how long they are 
going to be there. . . . People need to know who they are and they should get 
introduced to them and all the stuff like that. How to do it? We’re always in a 
group in a shift meeting. Here at [plant name] we always have the assistant 
production manager and the production manager in the meetings every morning, 
so any new stuff gets mentioned then. The supervisor in the shift handover 
meeting would be the best person to do it. 
Another participant noted, 
[Employee name] made a point every morning at 7:00 am, all the support people 
met. “OK, what are you doing today? What are you focusing on? What are you 
focusing on?” I don’t know if that was done before. . . . Nightshift was covered in 
another meeting at the beginning of the night shift. . . . It was effective. When 
[employee name] wasn’t there, he had had the format of the meeting typed up and 
sent to the plant manager and said, “This is in your hands. If I’m not there that 
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week, you need to talk with your people.” . . . The meeting [employee name] had 
was good. We knew what people were doing, we knew what was going on, and it 
was a lot more structure. That would be a best practice. 
The second topic around plant support and the people coming into the plant was 
about making sure that the support staff receives ongoing training and development 
which was mentioned by five out of 13 participants. One participant described the 
following, 
Especially when you bring them in from different plants. We had an operator in 
from [plant name]. He had a way of working in his home plant and it wasn’t the 
way that we were doing to do it. We had to speak with him and how he was going 
to do his checks and all that. That can be a frustrating factor for people in the 
plants. I’ve seen it on multiple occasions. 
Another participant commented on the following, 
It can be a lot. They have attitudes. I’ve seen that. I didn’t have it so much in my 
area as I saw it on the floor. . . . They need to be reminded that they’re here for 
support, and not to belittle anybody. Not to run the plant. They’re here to support 
the plant. 
Recommendations Regarding Organizational Systems and Support 
Participants provided recommendations in regards to general organizational topics 
(see Table 11). Three out of 13 participants recommended that we need to make sure that 
we actively manage our customer expectations. One participant stated, 
Things are good now, but back then [customer name] were that demanding. It got 
to the stage where the frustration level went up and they were throwing 
everything back at us. [Employee name] was there at weekends! The frustrating 
part for me was that people from the customer on the fill lines would call her over 
and say, “We’ve got a bottle problem. We’ve got leakers.” She’d stop whatever 
she was doing on a Saturday. . . [and] spend all day Saturday and sometimes part 
of Sunday. And it would turn out it wasn’t our problem at all it was a [customer 
name] issue on the fill lines. Some of that happens in a new situation. Our QA 
managers, our planners, they get pulled into this. It’s all chaos. It’s all frustration. 
They get phone calls at night, they get phone calls at the weekend, and they get 
burnt out and we lose them. The plant manager needs to be part of this and set 
boundaries. The solution was to develop an escalation procedure. 
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Table 11 
General Organizational System Recommendations 
Recommendation n 
Actively manage customer expectations 3 
Institute procedures for enhancing cross-shift communication 2 
Accommodate workers’ physical needs during extreme heat 2 
Institute policies and procedures to measure plant performance 2 
N = 13 
 
Another recommendation from the participants, two out of 13, was to institute 
clear procedures about enhancing the cross-shift communication. One participant 
mentioned the following, 
All these shifts need to be doing the same thing. It wasn’t more structured. More 
structure would help a lot. We went from one shift to two shifts, and then to four 
shifts. From a procedure perspective how the supervisors lead the shift. More 
explaining the procedures better. Even team leads explaining what needs to be 
done better. 
Participants provided suggestions in the area of Human Resources practices such 
as employee recognition and recruiting policies to ensure appropriate staffing at startup 
(see Table 12). Six out of 13 participants commented on employee recognition. 
Suggestions were to provide various types of rewards to recognize employees across all 
shifts such as verbal recognition, encouragement, and feedback on performance; gift 
cards and other monetary incentives; training; building rapport; and providing food. One 
participant stated, 
At the end they started doing stuff like that, rewarding people for attendance, or 
job performance. Bringing food in. Yeah. If you do something for a long time. For 
a month. . . . You can have an efficiency goal or something like that then you do it 
for all four shifts. You can also recognize individually, it all depends on 
improvement. We could use it for training as well. You’ve proved that you’re that 
good. Some kind of recognition. Some kind of award or badge. A sticker. 
Anything. Any kind of award to let them know they’re doing well. They can build 
their confidence, their morale. It doesn’t have to be money. It can be a pat on the 
back sometime. But it has to be from the right people. 
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Table 12 
Human Resource Recommendations 
Recommendation n 
Institute formal reward and recognition system  
Provide various types of rewards to recognize employees across all shifts 
Verbal recognition, encouragement, and feedback on performance (5) 
Gift cards and other monetary incentives (4) 
Training (2) 
Building rapport (1) 
Food (1) 
6 
Not all employees require recognition 2 
Institute formal recruiting policies to ensure appropriate staffing at startup 3 
N = 13 
 
Please note that some of the participants felt no need for recognition. They just 
want to do their job and what is expected of them. 
Three participants stated the importance of implementing formal recruiting 
policies to ensure appropriate staffing at startup. One participant described the following, 
I think a big part of it is having the people filled before you start, because you’re 
getting so intensive training at the beginning, and it’s going to taper off, and the 
people who show up two months later are losing part of that. Have the budgeted 
people ready and come in the training phase. Right. It’s a big deal. 
A second participant mentioned, 
Our plant’s problem was finding the right management. Luckily I only went 
through two, but a lot of the departments went through so many managers. We 
went through three plant managers. . . . Finding the right people in the right places 
is what helped us get to this point. Having people that were here because they 
cared about the job not just because they wanted the job. 
Participants shared some recommendations about the overall project planning 
which includes a suggestion for a new approach in regards to plant startups and also some 
suggestions in regards to the area of secondary packaging. Three out of 13 participants 
mentioned the idea of installing a specialized startup team for new plant startups (see 
Table 13). One participant cited the following: “Every new plant startup is a progression 
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from the last one, as long as the same group continues to start them up. You need the 
continuation of the same people starting the plants and that same transfer of knowledge.” 
Another participant stated, 
I think having a team that can come up here and work with people for a little 
while. I know every start up is going to be unique. . . . I think the team, the help 
that would come in and work with the people and know that they were here to 
work with the people and didn’t have the big heads saying, “Oh we’re the elite 
group from [company name]. . . . If you get people in there that do have that kind 
of attitude, weed them out. Don’t leave them in there. . . . When you bring a group 
of people in to help, they need to be able to help, to educate the people, to 
encourage them to do the job that they want to do. . . . To me that would be the 
most beneficial part of the whole start up. The support of a complete group and 
tools to do the job that you need. It’s hard enough to start a plant up. You don’t 
need people coming in with attitudes right off the bat. . . . It’s one thing for people 
to come that really know how to do things, but if they don’t show you how to do 
it, it’s useless. 
For the area of secondary packaging the participants had two different 
suggestions. Two participants suggested to install a mock line either at the company itself 
or at the supplier site. One participant identified the following option, 
At [former company name], we knew everything for the most part that we were 
going to be having. . . . We went there, and they had actually set up what we were 
going to be getting, at a warehouse. We did some kind of “mock production” at 
the time. They worked in conjunction with us. They took the machinery we were 
going to be getting, took it to an empty warehouse to pre-train some of our people 
to understand some of the robotics. Not only did we get the hands on at the actual 
production facility, some of the things were going to be different, we still got 
hands on but at a different location. That helped us. As soon as we got it in our 
facility, there wasn’t any question about how we had to run it. We already 
understood it. . . . If we do have a complex start up like here, we can have better 
communication with the suppliers, whatever downstream suppliers we have, 
maybe set up prototype lines to get some hands on experience and realistic 
experience, so if we get into all kinds of problems we can address it then. . . . The 
more things you can address in advance, to really know what you’re getting into, 
the easier the startup will be. 
Another suggestion around the area of secondary packaging was to manage 
secondary packaging equipment suppliers more effectively. One participant mentioned 
the following, 
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We should be pushing our suppliers far harder. . . . The people we’re supplying to 
want the bottles. They don’t care about our palletizer. They don’t care about our 
labeler. They just care that they get the bottles from us. . . . We should have said, 
“I don’t care about the other people you’re working for, [supplier name], I want 
you here and I want you here now and get it running.” And that’s where I would 
have taken a far more direct line. 
 
Table 13 
Project Management and Equipment Recommendations 
Recommendation n 
Optimize project management  
Create specialized startup team for new plant startups 3 
Assure project plan has realistic timelines 2 
Improve procedures related to secondary packaging equipment  
Create mock line for secondary packaging equipment 2 
Manage secondary packaging equipment suppliers more effectively 1 
N = 13 
 
Summary 
A total of 13 participants were interviewed as part of this study and provided 
insights related to their impressions of the startup experience. They also made 
recommendations for the type of leadership, training and knowledge sharing, and 
organizational systems and support needed for a new plant startup. Regarding their 
impressions, participants noted several successes in the early startup phase having to do 
with the plant manager’s availability, training and support delivered, and communication 
and employee recognition practiced. Several early challenges also were noted related to 
leadership, staffing and training, and secondary packaging equipment as well as other 
organizational systems issues. Later startup phase challenges primarily concerned 
leadership and organizational systems challenges. Participants additionally noted that the 
ABC plant was unlike other plants related to its culture and processes, complexity, 
staffing, and leadership. 
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Participants’ recommendations regarding leadership focused on improving leader 
selection and preparation. Recommendations for training and knowledge sharing focused 
on optimizing training resources, schedules, and materials for each area so that personnel 
throughout the plant will be adequately prepared for their roles. Participants further 
recommended that the plant needs to better coordinate and communicate schedules for 
visiting support staff and ensure they receive ongoing training and development. 
Participants’ recommendations regarding organizational systems and support included 
general suggestions, suggestions for human resources, project management, and 
equipment. The next chapter provides a discussion of these results. 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to identify what personnel need in order to rapidly 
achieve steady and sustainable performance during the startup phase of a new 
manufacturing facility in the rigid plastics packaging industry. Four research questions 
were examined: 
1. What were employees’ impressions of the startup experience? 
2. What recommendations do employees provide regarding the type of 
leadership needed for a new plant startup? 
3. What recommendations do employees provide regarding training and 
knowledge sharing needed for a new plant startup? 
4. What recommendations do employees provide regarding the organizational 
systems and support needed for a new plant startup? 
This chapter provides a discussion of the study results. Conclusions related to 
each research question are provided first, followed by recommendations for the study 
organization and for the organization development consultant. Limitations of the study 
are then acknowledged and suggestions for continued research are outlined. 
Conclusions 
Employee impressions of the startup experience. Overall, the technical training 
for the blow molding machines has been successful, including the 6-weeks pre-training 
phase in the Midwest where the corporate academy training concept and materials had 
been used, as well as the onsite training at the ABC plant once production started. The 
implication of this is that the machine operators started out with a good basic 
understanding of how to run the machines, which gave them some confidence and a 
feeling that they were prepared for the basic tasks of their position. Further, it appears 
that this aspect of the overall plant startup process is working effectively. This finding 
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echoes what can be found in the literature in terms of the importance of deploying and 
extending productive knowledge to new startup plants (Salomon & Martin, 2008). 
Another key take away concerns the effective and helpful support two taskforce 
members from the corporate technical unit in Austria provided to the plant. Both 
individuals possess profound technical expertise and, therefore, were able to (a) make the 
modifications needed to process the new bottle and (b) train the US trainers and support 
people so they, in turn, were able to train the machine operators. Both individuals had 
respected capabilities and social skills as trainers. This finding underscores the critical 
role parent companies play in new plant startups, as prior experiences and organizational 
learning can be leveraged in new startups to promote a shorter time-to-build and time to 
become operational (Doeringer et al., 2002). 
Additionally, study findings indicated that good team work and energy were 
evident at the beginning of the startup. People were excited about the project, they 
supported each other, and worked together as a big team. Participants explained that 
being part of a startup project creates a strong bond among those involved. From that 
perspective, things were going well at the beginning. 
However, to sustain this initial positivity and momentum, it is crucial to have 
people with the right experience and competence in key leadership roles in a startup 
plant. At ABC plant, finding the right person for the maintenance manager role has been 
a significant challenge that has tremendously and adversely affected the entire project. 
Participants additionally reported that staffing in general has been challenging, as ABC 
has had difficulty finding candidates with the right qualifications. This emphasizes the 
importance of establishing new processes and procedures for recruiting and selecting the 
talent necessary to run a plant with this level of complexity. The relevant key roles for 
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each startup plant need to be defined early in the process when the organizational 
structure of the new plant can be influenced. 
The area of secondary packaging equipment has been the most challenging aspect 
of the plant startup, due to multiple factors. With similar projects in the future, the 
company needs to put more effort in preparing a thorough and detailed design, layout, 
and planning of the secondary packaging lines. The goal should be to make equipment 
choices that result in a level of complexity that matches the organization’s operational 
handling skills and competencies. Similarly, past research has indicated that the nature 
and complexity of the technology introduced to a startup plant plays a critical role and 
has a substantial impact on time-to-build (Galbraith, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1993; 
Teece, 1977). 
Given the challenges of the secondary packaging equipment at ABC plant, it is 
crucial to have an onsite employee with the capabilities and authority to manage the 
different suppliers in a way that they are hold accountable for their actions. Additionally, 
the company needs to establish a thorough process for selecting the right person for this 
position. In addition to having suitable technical and business experience and 
competencies, the candidate also should fit culturally with the company. Assuring this fit 
could be accomplished using cultural fit assessment tools. 
Moreover, company leadership should define a process for collecting feedback on 
a regular basis, with the aim of intervening as necessary if the startup is not progressing 
as expected. Feedback processes may include assembling relevant project members and 
plant staff every 6 weeks to assess project progress. Leaders also should make sure that 
the company policies and procedures, best practices, and routines are implemented early 
in the startup phase to promote process standardization. 
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It is crucial for the startup plant manager and his or her leadership team to 
embrace the company culture. This goal is supported by having existing company 
employees relocate to the new location. In this scenario, the company culture is brought 
in and modeled by senior employees. Lawler (1991) explained how critical it is during a 
plant startup to have the right plant leadership in place. Lawler asserted that managers 
must be coaches, leaders, and expert resources. 
Additionally, it will be important for future startups to make a thorough and 
honest assessment about the overall complexity of the plant. Executive leadership needs 
to decide whether it is necessary to engage external resources to effectively manage the 
startup project. 
The organization’s human resource department needs to make a thorough 
assessment of the local labor market in at the location of the startup plant. Based on the 
findings, a competitive compensation structure needs to be put in place and managed over 
time to capture market movements. 
Recommendations regarding leadership. The leadership team at each plant 
needs to embrace the company culture and lead by example. The company could achieve 
this by educating the leadership team about the company culture. Regular feedback loops 
also are needed to learn more about the local plant culture and assess alignment with the 
overall company culture. 
Startup plant managers should be hired 5 or 6 months before plant startup so they 
receive a thorough onboarding with the company. As part of the onboarding process, the 
startup plant manager needs to spend some time both at a well-running plant and a poorly 
running plant. The goal of these rotations is to learn the daily, weekly, monthly and 
annual routines of the plant and the main processes for each function—both when a plant 
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is working well and when it is not. Several additional measures need to be taken to 
support the startup plant manager during the challenging onboarding phase. One such 
tactic is to assign a mentor to the startup manager who will provide support, empathic 
listening, and guidance as needed. 
Recommendations regarding training and knowledge sharing. Efficient, 
effective, and consistent training is needed for all functional areas of a startup. Training 
should be planned and knowledgeable and skilled trainers should be allocated, in 
particular, for production planning, spare parts inventory, the tool room, and more. 
E-learning training also is anticipated to play an increasing role in the future, as it 
offers a highly scalable and cost-effective training option and further allows learners to 
modules at their own pace. 
Depending on the overall complexity of the startup plant, a wide range of support 
people may be needed. To guarantee successful visits by these support people, it is 
crucial to coordinate their activities. One recommendation is to hold daily shift meetings 
(e.g., one in the morning, one in the afternoon) so all the support activities can be 
coordinated and managed proactively. 
It is also crucial that support visits and schedules are communicated at all levels 
of the plant so staff know who is visiting, where they are coming from, what their 
assignments are, and how long they will stay. A simple tool for providing this 
communication could be a white board in the production area where visitors’ profile, 
picture, and plans are posted. Additionally, it would be helpful for one person onsite at 
the plant to keep track of all the visiting support people and to coordinate with the 
relevant parties to make sure the full coverage is guaranteed in areas where needed. 
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Recommendations regarding organizational systems and support. Startup 
plants rely upon established routines to support the development of a good working 
relationship with customers. The introduction of the new startup plant manager, therefore, 
needs to be a strong focus. It is also important to manage the customer so that unrealistic 
expectations are identified and adjusted. Root cause analyses also need to be thoroughly 
evaluated before rushing to blame suppliers. 
Plant leadership should take into account employee wellbeing for startups that 
occur during periods of extreme weather. For example, employees need to have ample 
water, more breaks, and cooling bands during summer months. 
Clear goals and key performance indicators need to defined for new startup 
projects. Once established, these need to be promptly communicated to establish a 
performance-based culture within the company. Targets should be adjusted as needed to 
promote realistic goal setting. 
Having effective human resource practices in place from the beginning of the 
startup is very important. Employee recognition should be built into the leadership 
culture so that employees are acknowledged for their good work regularly as well as both 
formally and informally. 
Recruiting is an important part of a startup project and, therefore, needs to be a 
focus so that the organization has enough resources in the form of available people, time, 
and competencies. Assuring that the organization has sufficient recruiting resources in 
place also needs to be assured so that staffing does not become a problem throughout the 
plant. It is crucial to follow the recruiting process and not to allow any shortcuts due to 
time constraints. Ultimately, US corporate leadership is responsible for ensuring that 
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necessary competencies are available to plan and manage a highly technical complex 
startup project, either internally or externally through consulting companies. 
A new way to approach startup situations would be to install a startup team. This 
team would consist of highly skilled and experienced team members who have already 
been part of at least two startups in the past with the company. These team members 
should know the company’s policies, procedures, and processes well so that they embrace 
and help propagate the company culture. 
One way to approach the challenge of high complexity in the area of secondary 
packaging would be to install a mock line that would allow testing of the whole line and 
to verify the interplay of all the equipment pieces. This would need to be done before the 
startup in a separate location occurs. A possible location for the mock line could be one 
of the supplier locations. 
Recommendations 
Recommendations for executive leadership. Three recommendations for 
executive leadership are offered based on the study findings. First, the study findings 
indicated that many of the challenges experienced emerged from the complex nature of 
the secondary packaging equipment and the need to incorporate multiple pieces of 
equipment that needed to be aligned and synced with each other. To address this 
challenge, US corporate leadership needs to either hire qualified staff or external 
consultants and experts. One interesting approach would be to install a mock/test line in a 
warehouse or at a supplier site to allow for problems to be identified and ameliorated 
before production begins. Although this approach is capital intensive, conducting a cost-
benefit analysis of a mock line would be helpful. 
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The second recommendation is based on the finding that onsite support staff 
people are needed for startups characterized by high complexity and technical challenges. 
In particular, participants expressed the benefits of having company-specific knowledge 
and experience available onsite on an ongoing basis for a defined time frame in all the 
key functions. Installing a startup launch team that supports the overall goal of meeting 
defined due dates and fulfilling project schedules may help to this end. 
The third recommendation is that startup outcomes could be improved by 
conducting a pre-mortem to identify the challenges that could undermine the startup. 
Potential challenges may include secondary packaging equipment (whether it is a single 
piece of equipment or multiple pieces that need to be aligned and coordinated), new 
product designs (e.g., bottles, caps, or closures) that require process or equipment 
modifications, labor and talent shortages, and market competition. Based on the 
challenges identified, key roles for the plant startup should be defined and the needed 
knowledge, skills, and abilities for each role should be defined. To begin the process of 
hiring, at least two to there qualified candidates per role should be identified. Once the 
roles are filled, the staff should be thoroughly trained to effectively carry out their roles. 
Emphasis should be given to cultivating both the soft and hard skills needed for their 
roles. 
Given the challenges experienced by the plant concerning plant leadership, the 
fourth recommendation is to assure that a strong recruiting and selection process is 
established to guide hiring for the plant. In particular, the study organization is advised to 
either make the internal process more robust or to select a qualified external company to 
handle recruiting. Specific recommendations to improve the current hiring process are as 
follows: 
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• The human resources director, training manager or an external organization 
development practitioner should lead a facilitated meeting with diverse 
stakeholders to create job profiles for the key plant positions. Recommended 
stakeholders to include in the meeting are the general manager, vice president of 
manufacturing, hiring manager, program and project management manager, 
human resources director, and internal recruiter. Involving multiple stakeholders 
can promote alignment and clear understanding about the scope and demands of 
these roles. Based on the position profiles, key success criteria and qualifications 
(both required and preferred) also should be defined.  
• The human resources director should facilitate an interview team meeting before 
the hiring process begins to brief all involved personnel about the job profiles, 
success criteria, intended behavioral interview questions, and interview schedule. 
The director also should provide needed tools at this time, including interview 
scripts and candidate evaluation sheets. 
• At least two assessment instruments selected by the human resource director and 
the internal recruiter should be administered to candidates to gather additional 
information to inform the hiring process. 
• An interview team meeting should be held before selecting the final candidate for 
each position. The focus of this meeting should be review each member’s input 
and evaluation of the candidates.  
• One day a week (e.g., Friday) should be reserved for several weeks to ensure 
availability of interview team members for needed meetings. 
Recommendations for project management. Two recommendations are offered 
to project managers based on the study findings. First, one study finding indicated that 
some key responsible stakeholders for the startup from US corporate were not available 
onsite until issues reached a critical level. To avoid this situation, a regular feedback loop 
should be implemented. This could occur through a regular call convened by the project 
manager with the responsible onsite stakeholders. Meeting frequency depends on the 
project phase and progress. The meeting focus will be to assure the project is on 
schedule. A specified agenda should guide the meeting, minutes should be taken, and 
project status should be fed back to the project management structure (Project Delivery 
Review Board [PDRB]). To improve the value of the regular status report (PDRB) 
66 
 
meetings, an escalation procedure should be instituted where projects showing “red” 
status three times in a row trigger the scheduling of a crisis team meeting. This meeting 
should be led by a neutral person who has strong facilitation skills, such as the human 
resource director, the training manager, or an external organization development 
practitioner. 
Study findings indicated that the employees at all levels at the startup plant have 
experienced substantial frustration. Moreover, frustration escalated as technical 
challenges continued to go unresolved. Therefore, the second recommendation is for the 
project management group to gather regular firsthand feedback from individuals on the 
startup plant floor. Methods for doing so include brief all-employee surveys or focus 
groups (the preferred solution). Focus groups should be convened by a neutral external 
party (e.g., a US corporate human resource person, an external organization development 
practitioner) with a representative number of the shift’s employees. These could be 
conducted as lunch or dinner meetings, and the focus of the discussion should be simply 
to ask how things are going. Although a structured set of questions should be used, free-
flowing and in-depth discussion should be encouraged through follow-up questions. 
Feedback procedures like this offer two benefits: company leaders gain valuable 
information and employees feel heard and taken seriously. Results of the discussions 
need to be reported back the US leadership team. 
Recommendations for organization development consultants. 
Recommendations also are offered to organization development consultants who aim to 
assist a startup effort. There are multiple engagement opportunities for an organization 
development practitioner. In the study organization, findings indicated that the startup 
began in a promising manner, despite some known technical challenges and high 
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complexity due to the bottle design and secondary packaging equipment. However, over 
time, employees’ enthusiasm and excitement about the startup faded and became 
escalating frustration as the technical issues remained unresolved. Organization 
development practitioners may offer several benefits under such conditions. 
First, the organization development consultant could work hand-in-hand with the 
project manager to assure that feedback is gathered and reported back to the organization. 
In particular, organization development practitioners could help design, implement, and 
operate a standardized feedback process (see recommendation above) and also could help 
facilitate regular project status meetings. Moreover, organization development 
practitioners could assure that people-related concerns are observed during these 
procedures. 
Second, study findings suggested that employees’ growing frustration was 
associated with eventual disengagement of the plant manager and other key personnel. 
This indicates that the US corporate stakeholders did not successfully manage these 
aspects of the project, for whatever reason. The organization development consultant 
could help the project manager create an escalation procedure that establishes clear 
processes for addressing critical issues. Part of this process should include proposing 
appropriate interventions for resolving emergent issues to relevant stakeholders. 
Third, participants suggested implementing mentor program for startup plant 
managers to provide them with needed support during challenging phases of the project. 
It is the organization development practitioner’s role to develop the mentor and assure 
that he or she is aware of the situation and issues at hand and congruent with the 
company culture. 
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Fourth, another study finding emphasized the importance of cultural fit during the 
hiring process for a new plant startup. Organization development practitioners can 
support this goal by facilitating cultural trainings and workshops with the leadership team 
and new plant employees early in the startup process. This will promote consistent 
understanding of the company culture across all plant leadership and employees. In 
particular, the organization development practitioner should introduce the company 
compass and share all activities provided at all the other plant locations with the startup 
plant manager and the local human resource manager. 
Limitations 
Two key limitations affected the present study and need to be acknowledged. 
First, the sample did not include all functions or people involved in the startup. For 
example, many people left through turnover and their perspectives were not included in 
this study. Additionally, most of study participants were from production. Thus, the 
findings largely represent the concerns and issues of participants and are not necessarily 
representative of all employees. For example, the use and need for temporary workers 
was significant for the startup but was not emphasized in the study findings. 
Second, the researcher has extensive experience in the study organization in 
general and with regard to new plant startups. This background likely led to researcher 
bias, as she was already knowledgeable of the issues hampering the startup before the 
start of the research project. Her foreknowledge may have consciously or subconsciously 
led her to emphasize or de-emphasize findings based on own experience and perceptions. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
The primary suggestion for further research is to repeat the study, correcting for 
the limitations. Specific suggestions are to include co-researchers to help reduce the 
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incidence of researcher bias. Additionally, the sample should be expanded to include all 
functions at the plant, as well as attempt to include personnel who were present at the 
beginning of the startup but who left at some point along the way. Additional methods of 
data gathering could be incorporated to further enhance the findings, such as including 
observation data and performance data. 
Summary 
The purpose of this qualitative study was to identify what personnel need in order 
to rapidly achieve steady and sustainable performance during the startup phase of a new 
manufacturing facility in the rigid plastics packaging industry. Data were gathered 
through 13 interviews with personnel who were present during plant startup. Participants 
were asked to provide their impressions of the startup experience and recommendations 
for the type of leadership, training and knowledge sharing, and organizational systems 
and support needed for a new plant startup. Participants noted both successes and 
challenges related to the plant manager, training and support delivered, and 
communication and other organizational systems in place. Participants additionally noted 
that the ABC plant was unlike other plants related to its culture and processes, 
complexity, staffing, and leadership. Participants’ offered several recommendations, 
including improving leader selection and preparation; optimizing training resources, 
schedules, and materials for each area; improving coordination, communication, and 
training for visiting support staff; and adapting human resources, project management, 
and equipment. Based on these findings, several recommendations for executive leaders, 
project management, and organization development consultants were identified. The key 
suggestion for continued research is to repeat the study with an enhanced design. 
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Appendix: Interview Script 
Name: ______________________________________ 
Date: ______________________________________ 
 
The interview consists of two parts. The first part is around demographic questions. The 
second part is about your experiences during the startup phase of the [ABC] plant. The 
information provided in this interview will not be related back to you as an individual. 
The idea is to collect input from people who have been involved in the startup and who 
have relevant information to share so the company can improve future start up situations. 
 
Demographic Questions 
1. How old are you? 
___ 18 – 25 ___ 26 – 39 ___ 40 – 55 ___ 56+ 
 
2. How long have you worked for [the company]? 
___ 0 – 4 years ___ 5 – 9 years 
___ 10 – 14 years ___ 15+ years 
 
3. What is your gender? 
___ Male ___ Female 
 
4. What is your highest level of education? 
___ High school ___ Some college ___ Bachelor Degree ___ Master’s Degree 
___ PhD  ___ Other 
 
5. What is your current position? 
 
6. What was your position at the time you joined the company? 
 
7. Who was your supervisor for your first year of employment at [the company] in 
[ABC]? 
 
8. How many manufacturing startups have you been involved in besides [ABC] (whether 
at [this company] or at another employer)? 
 
9. What role(s) did you play during the startup? 
10. When you think about the startup of the [ABC] plant, what stands out most to you 
about your experience? 
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11. Looking at the startup of the [ABC] plant from an overall perspective, what would 
you say went well?  Ask probing questions such as – Tell me more about that? – Why 
do you think that happened? 
12. What did not go that well? And what are the reasons for that? 
13. Is there anything you would have liked the plant manager do differently? If yes, what 
is that? 
14. Looking at the training for new employees, what went really well? 
 
15. And what did not go that well in regards to that training? 
16. Have there been any additional support people available during the startup, either 
from the SVC (US corporate) or from other plants? If yes, has this been helpful? What 
has been especially helpful about them? Is there any support you didn’t have that wish 
you did? 
 
17. How would you describe the overall communication? What went well and what did 
not go that well? What would have been helpful, especially during the startup phase? 
18. Did the employees feel recognized during the startup phase? If yes, what kind of 
recognition did they get? If not, what kind of recognition would have been helpful? 
 
19. Was [ABC] a typical plant startup here? If no, what was different compared to other 
plant startups? 
20. What kind of preparation is provided to the plant manager before the actual startup? 
What kind of guidance is provided to the plant manager during the startup phase? Is the 
guidance helpful? If no, what is missing? 
21. Is there anything else about your experience with the startup that you would like to 
share, such as recommendations or best practices? 
 
 
